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Ivan Franceschini
In today’s globalised and interconnected 
world, Chinese labour issues have become 
much more than merely a local matter. 
With China’s political and economic power 
increasing by the day, it is imperative not only 
to assess how this growing influence affects 
labour relations in other countries, but also 
to abandon an ‘exceptional’ view of China 
by engaging in more comparative research. 
In this sense, the study of Chinese labour 
indeed provides a powerful lens—or perhaps 
a mirror—to further our understanding of the 
contemporary world and our potential futures. 
With this aim in mind, in this issue of Made 
in China we publish a series of essays that 
either frame Chinese labour comparatively 
or examine its transnational implications. 
In Chinese Multinational Corporations 
in Europe, Zheng and Smith challenge 
the widespread perception that Chinese 
investments are undermining labour standards 
in Europe. In Liquid Labourscape, Diana 
looks into the governance experimentations 
in a Chinese special economic zone in Laos. 
In Outsourcing Exploitation, Franceschini 
compares wages, expectations, and needs of 
Chinese and Cambodian garment workers. 
In Trade Union Reform in Two One-Party 
States, Chan assesses the prospects for union 
democracy in China and Vietnam. Finally, in 
Prospects for US-China Union Relations in 
the Era of Xi and Trump, Quan reconstructs 
the bumpy history of exchanges between 
American and Chinese unions, and suggests 
possible ways to foster mutual engagement in 
the current political climate.
In the spirit of adopting a ‘global’ line of 
inquiry, we include a Forum consisting of 
three pieces that deal with the future of 
research on contemporary China in the West. 
In Treating What Ails the Study of Chinese 
Politics, Hurst makes an argument for freeing 
political studies of China from isolation by 
engaging in comparative research. In Let a 
Hundred Flowers Bloom, Sorace responds by 
arguing that in addition to making China more 
relevant to global political studies, we should 
also consider how the study of China can help 
us rethink the study of comparative politics 
at a more basic level. In Beyond the Great 
Paywall, Loubere and Franceschini argue 
that commercial academic publishing poses a 
fundamental challenge to academic freedom 
when it comes to research on contemporary 
China, and propose open access publishing as 
a viable alternative.
This issue also includes essays related to 
labour and civil society. In The Mental Health 
Costs of Repression, Macbean looks at the 
toll that the latest crackdown is taking on 
the psychological wellbeing of human rights 
lawyers in China. In Collective Bargaining and 
Universal Basic Income, Lin compares these 
two strategies in relation to the empowerment 
of Chinese workers. In #iSlaveat10, Chan 
reviews ten years of struggles at Foxconn, 
the Taiwanese-owned contractor of Apple. 
The Window on Asia section includes an 
essay entitled In the Shadow of Kem Ley, in 
which Norén-Nilsson considers the recent 
politicisation of Cambodian civil society. The 
cultural section comprises two essays. In Ai 
Weiwei’s #Refugees, Strafella and Berg offer 
their take on the latest endeavours of the 
Chinese artist. In Collecting the Red Era in 
Contemporary China, Williams looks into 
the archival practices of Chinese collectors 
of Maoist memorabilia and how they relate 
to historical memory. We conclude by 
interviewing Maria Repnikova about her new 
book on Chinese journalism, Media Politics in 
China.
This journal is hosted by the website 
Chinoiresie.info. If you would like to receive 
this journal regularly by email, please 
subscribe to our mailing list. 
The Editors
Chinese Labour in a 
Global Perspective
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Liu Xiaobo Passes Away and 
Liu Xia Goes Missing
Continuing Repression of 
Human Rights Lawyers and 
Activists
In the past three months, the Chinese government 
has continued its repression of human rights 
activists and lawyers. There is little doubt that 
this is an orchestrated national campaign. During 
a conference at the National Judges College in 
Beijing at the end of August, Minister of Justice 
Zhang Jun called on lawyers to refrain from 
engaging in protests, criticising judges and courts, 
and speaking or acting for personal gain or to 
boost their reputation. A couple of weeks later, 
the Ministry of Justice launched investigations 
into the conduct of several lawyers and law firms 
across China, including the firm of prominent 
human rights lawyer Mo Shaoping. In August, 
human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong and online 
activist ‘Super Vulgar Butcher’ Wu Gan went on 
trial for their crimes of subversion of state power. 
On 11 September, Taiwanese activist Lee Ming-
cheh went on trial and pleaded guilty to charges of 
subversion in a televised confession. Alarmingly, 
there has since been no public information on his 
whereabouts. Likewise, lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who 
has been under house arrest since 2014, is now 
reported as missing and is believed to be in police 
custody. Labour activists do not fare any better. 
After initially being detained in May 2015, labour 
activist Liu Shaoming was sentenced to four and 
a half years in prison for ‘inciting subversion 
of state power’ in July. Similarly, in August, Lu 
Yuyu, a former migrant worker who documented 
mass protests in China, was sentenced to four 
years in prison on charges of ‘picking quarrels 
and provoking trouble’ (he is currently appealing 
the sentence). To conclude on a more positive 
note, human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong and labour 
activist Meng Han were both released from prison, 
after serving sentences of four years and twenty-
one months respectively for ‘gathering crowds to 
disturb public order’.  TS & EN
(Sources: BBC; China Labour Bulletin; Front 
Line Defenders; Human Rights Watch; Ministry 
of Justice; Radio Free Asia 1; Radio Free Asia 2; 
South China Morning Post; The Australian; The 
New York Times)
JUL/SEP
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On 13 July, the activist and Nobel laureate Liu 
Xiaobo passed away at the age of sixty-one in 
the First Hospital of China Medical University 
in Shenyang. Much to the anger of his friends 
and supporters, his ashes were buried at sea, off 
the coast of Dalian. Liu had been imprisoned 
since 2009 for ‘inciting state subversion’, but in 
June was granted parole to receive treatment for 
advanced liver cancer. Requests from Liu and 
his family to receive medical treatment outside 
of China were denied. After the funeral, Liu’s 
wife—the artist Liu Xia—went missing for over a 
month, only appearing in a YouTube video to say 
she was mourning her husband’s death outside 
of Beijing. The disappearance of Liu Xia, who 
has been under house arrest since 2010, sparked 
further international condemnation of the Chinese 
government. Chinese authorities denied detaining 
Liu Xia, claiming that she was a ‘free citizen’, 
and suggesting that she had not communicated 
with family or friends due to her grief. In early 
September, Liu Xia was reported to have returned 
to her Beijing home. However, her supporters 
remain concerned about her mental health, as she 
is reportedly suffering from depression induced by 
years of captivity, surveillance, and the death of 
her husband. NL
(Sources: BBC; South China Morning Post 1; 
South China Morning Post 2; The Guardian; The 
Washington Post)
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In July, Shenyang Urban Construction University 
offered a public apology to a second-year 
student pressured by the university into a three-
month internship at a Foxconn factory in Yantai, 
Shandong province. The university had told her 
that, had she refused to comply, she would not 
have been able to graduate. To deal with rising 
labour costs, in recent years Taiwanese electronics 
manufacturer Foxconn has struck several deals 
with Chinese secondary vocational schools and 
universities to hire students as paid interns in its 
factories. This young workforce has often voiced 
dissatisfaction about cramped accommodations, 
inadequate meals, and a type of work that they 
consider to be unrelated to their studies. Since 
the apology, the Department of Education in 
Liaoning province—the area where the University 
is located—has ordered an investigation and halted 
such internships at public universities. Foxconn 
has also issued a statement, saying that the 
company had fully complied with the existing laws 
and regulations, and that interns had been fully 
informed about the programme and had the right 
to leave at any time. However, the company has 
a history of hiring interns that goes back at least 
a decade (see Jenny Chan’s article in this issue). 
Back in 2012, the Taiwanese manufacturer was 
criticised by labour rights groups for exploiting 
forced internship labour, but the company denied 
all allegations of wrongdoing. Only one year later, 
in 2013, as more evidence from investigations 
emerged, Foxconn had to admit that student 
interns worked overtime and night shifts at its 
Yantai factory. Even at that time, students reported 
that they had no choice but to take part in the 
factory internship programme if they wanted to 
graduate. Considering what happened in Liaoning, 
it appears that the new regulations issued by the 
Ministry of Education to protect student interns in 
2016 have had little effect in curbing these kinds 
of abuses. KL
(Sources: Financial Times; Ministry of Education; 
South China Morning Post; The New York Times; 
Sina)
University Apologises for 
Forced Internships
Village in Beijing Charges 
Migrant Workers
In July, the rural village of Qiuxian in Beijing’s 
Daxing district announced plans to start charging 
migrant residents two thousand yuan (about 295 
USD) per month. The document released by the 
village leadership stated that the fees collected 
would be used to pay for public sanitation, tap 
water, public security, and electricity, but also made 
it clear that the levy will ‘fulfil the target of having 
zero migrants in our village.’ Those who do not pay 
will be denied services and evicted. While some 
legal experts have questioned the legality of the 
measure, the village’s decision is best understood 
in the context of the Beijing government’s policy 
to place further restrictions on its migrant 
population. In April, the authorities indicated 
their intention to cap the city’s population—now 
at twenty-two million—at twenty-three million 
‘long-term residents’ by 2020. In recent years, 
the capital has moved its secondary bureaucracies 
and university campuses to cities in neighbouring 
Hebei province. Moreover, in 2016 alone, thirty 
million square metres of small shops, restaurants, 
and fruit stands considered to be ‘illegal 
constructions’ were dismantled, with another 
forty million square metres set for demolition in 
2017. Schools for migrant children on the outskirts 
of Beijing have been forced to close, and car-
sharing services have been restricted to local 
drivers, thus excluding migrants. While China is 
pursuing migrants’ integration and urbanisation 
as an engine of economic growth as it transitions 
away from low-end manufacturing, rural migrants 
are encouraged to stay away from mega-cities like 
Beijing and Shanghai, and instead settle in second-
tier and provincial cities. KL
(Sources: Caixin Global 1; Caixin Global 2; 
Caixin (Chinese); Financial Times; South China 
Morning Post) 
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Maternal Leave Extended in 
Thirty Provinces
Since the amended Population and Family Planning 
Law in January 2016 universally allowed married 
couples to have a second child, 30 provinces and 
regions have required employers to extend paid 
maternity leave. In these areas, on top of the 
nationally mandated 98 days, female employees 
are now entitled to an additional leave of 1 to 3 
months. In more prosperous municipalities such 
as Beijing and Shanghai, as well as provinces like 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu, female employees are now 
given 128 days paid leave after the birth of a child. 
A number of provinces such as Hebei, Liaoniang, 
Sichuan, and Shandong allow female employees 
158 days of paid maternity leave. While Henan and 
Hainan provinces have seen the largest increase, 
from 98 days to 190 days, the longest leave is to 
be found in the Tibet Autonomous Region where 
female employees are given one year of paid 
maternity leave. While this is good news for 
millions of female workers, Beijing News reported 
that many women still face difficulties in claiming 
this right, as many companies adopt internal 
policies aimed at restricting the frequency and 
timing of pregnancies, and impose hefty financial 
penalties for violators. This highlights the 
persistence of gender discrimination in China, in 
spite of the many laws and regulations that forbid 
it. In practice, women are disadvantaged for having 
children, a situation that has serious ramifications 
for the government’s plans to encourage population 
growth in an ageing society. KL
(Sources: Beijing News (Chinese); Los Angeles 
Times; Shanghai Daily; SupChina)
China’s Influence Abroad 
under Scrutiny
In September, HRW released ‘The Costs of 
International Advocacy’, a report that scrutinises 
China’s activities at the United Nations (UN). 
According to the Report, at numerous points 
throughout 2017, UN agencies have made 
concessions towards China on matters related 
to human rights and civil society. For instance, 
in January, UN officials sent home an estimated 
three thousand staff and NGO representatives on 
the occasion of a keynote speech by President Xi 
Jinping in order to prevent their attendance at 
the session. In another incident in April, security 
officials removed ethnic Uyghur activist Dolkun 
Isa from the UN headquarters in New York while 
he was attending a forum on indigenous issues. 
In July, Isa was also stopped and briefly detained 
by the police in Rome acting on a request from 
Chinese authorities who consider him a terrorist. 
Such instances have raised questions regarding 
the UN’s apparent capitulations to China’s 
demands. Dismissed by the Chinese authorities as 
‘groundless’ and ‘biased’, the Report was released 
in the middle of heated controversies about China’s 
growing influence abroad. Australia is a good case 
in point. Since the summer, Australian media have 
reported on Australian political parties accepting 
million of dollars from Chinese businessmen, 
and on Chinese students ‘infiltrating’ Australian 
universities to spy on—and eventually intimidate—
their classmates and lecturers. This has led to 
repeated calls from Australian scholars and 
politicians for more public scrutiny of Beijing’s 
interference in the local tertiary education 
system, as well as for the increased supervision of 
commercial partnerships with enterprises linked 
to the Chinese government. TS & EN
(Sources: ABC News; Canberra Times; Global 
Times; Human Rights Watch; News.com.au; 
Radio Free Asia; Reuters; Sydney Morning 
Herald)
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Beijing Attempts to 
Censor Foreign Academic 
Publications
In mid-August, Cambridge University Press (CUP) 
conceded that it had acted on a request from 
Chinese authorities to block 315 articles from the 
Chinese website of The China Quarterly, one of the 
most prestigious and long-running international 
China Studies journals. CUP’s decision prompted 
outrage in the academic community and beyond. 
After a few days of petitions and threats of an 
academic boycott, CUP reversed its decision and 
agreed to make all the censored articles available 
free of charge worldwide. While the scholarly 
community was successful in pressuring CUP, 
this incident has exposed the serious challenges 
that are facing academic publishers operating in 
the lucrative Chinese market. It has since been 
revealed that LexisNexis, a provider of legal, 
regulatory, and business information, withdrew 
content in China at the request of the authorities. 
Moreover, in anonymous interviews at the Beijing 
International Book Fair in late August, other 
commercial publishers admitted to engaging in 
self-censorship in order to retain access to the 
Chinese market. Meanwhile, there have also been 
disturbing revelations that the censors are engaged 
in systematically deleting historical articles from 
Chinese journals that do not toe the current 
ideological line. Beijing has responded defiantly to 
the international condemnation, inviting Western 
institutions to leave China if they do not want to 
follow Chinese rules, and warning that all imported 
publications ‘must adhere to Chinese laws and 
regulations.’ For more on the implications of the 
CUP incident for academia’s involvement with the 
commercial publishing industry, see Loubere and 
Franceschini in this issue. NL
(Sources: Global Times; Reuters 1; Reuters 
2; South China Morning Post 1; The China 
Collection; The Guardian 1; The Guardian 2)
Political Activists Jailed in 
Hong Kong
On 17 August, Hong Kongese political activists 
Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow—all 
in their twenties—were found guilty of unlawful 
assembly in relation to their involvement in the 
2014 ‘Umbrella Movement’, and jailed for six 
to eight months. The sentences also disqualify 
them from running for the city’s legislature for 
the next five years. The three activists played 
leading roles in the popular mobilisation in 2014, 
which was triggered by the Chinese authorities’ 
decision to rule out open nominations for the 
election of the new Chief Executive of Hong 
Kong in 2017—elections that were eventually won 
by Carrie Lam, a favourite of Beijing. One year 
ago, in 2016, the trio was sentenced to non-jail 
punishments, including community service. But 
the Department of Justice demanded a review of 
the ruling, seeking imprisonment. This reversal 
has been widely interpreted as a sign of increasing 
political interference from Beijing—a claim denied 
by the local authorities—with many questioning 
the independence of the city’s judiciary. In 
response, on 20 August, tens of thousands of 
people took to the streets of Hong Kong to express 
their discontent with the decision. New protests 
erupted on 1 October—the day that marked the 
sixty-eighth anniversary of the foundation of 
the People’s Republic of China—with protesters 
wearing black to call for the release of the ‘political 
prisoners’. Wong, Law, and Chow are not the only 
ones who are facing prosecution: according to 
observers, since the 2014 protests there have been 
at least thirty-nine cases against twenty-six pro-
democracy leaders, twenty-one of which are still 
ongoing. IF
(Sources: CNN; Kong Tsung-Gan Medium; 
Reuters)
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CHINA
COLUMNS
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Early in the morning of Thursday 9 July 
2015 police hammered on the door of Wang 
Yu’s apartment in Beijing and took her away. 
Within days, hundreds of Chinese lawyers 
were called in for questioning by the police 
or the local lawyers’ association. While the 
majority of lawyers were released within 
hours, many were detained for days, months 
and, for some, now years. The ‘709’ incident, 
as it became known, is the most high profile 
systematic hounding and prosecution of 
Chinese human rights defenders in recent 
years. 
For over a decade, feminists, democracy 
activists, workers’ representatives, rights 
defence (weiquan) lawyers and NGO staff 
have endured the threat of crackdowns and 
imprisonment as a deterrent to their activism. 
The authorities also deploy less high-profile 
measures to intimidate, harass, and punish 
activists: parents are bullied, old boyfriends 
approached, children are prevented from 
attending school, landlords are pressured into 
rescinding rental contracts, and high profile 
activists are not allowed to travel overseas. 
The police periodically step up the pressure 
on human rights defenders with unscheduled 
Nicola Macbean
Chinese civil society activists and rights-
protection lawyers are experiencing 
unprecedented levels of repression. The 
relentless pressure, as well as the acts of police 
violence and torture, has made many fearful 
of the consequences of their work. This is, 
inevitably, taking a toll on the mental health 
of activists. While psychological counselling 
services in China have expanded in recent years, 
most counsellors are reluctant to work with 
politically sensitive clients. This essay examines 
the need for the human rights community in 
China to develop the skills to address the mental 
health challenges of activism.
The Mental Health 
Costs of Repression
12
Cartoon: Badiucao
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visits to offices and homes, monitoring 
meetings, photographing visitors or installing 
surveillance cameras. Almost anyone working 
in the civil rights field has been invited by the 
police ‘to drink tea’ (he cha), a euphemism 
for an interview or a rebuke. More insidious 
is the unseen surveillance: the monitoring 
of social media and the hacking of email and 
private messaging. 
The Psychological Toll of 
State Repression
Disappearances and the fear they induce 
have long been a governance tool of the 
Chinese Communist Party. Yet, the current 
level of repression appears unprecedented. 
The authorities seem to hope that relentless 
pressure will deter activists while the new 
Overseas NGO Management Law cuts off 
the main source of funds to civil society. 
As domestic NGOs disband or are closed 
down, activism and the continued defence of 
human rights increasingly takes place on an 
individual or small scale. While this seems 
to offer some protection, working from home 
cuts off individuals from the conviviality 
and support of colleagues. Although social 
media partially offsets the physical isolation 
and need for social interaction, the constant 
stream of news detailing incidents and related 
calls for support can themselves be a source 
of stress. 
Human rights defenders share many of 
the same concerns as other over-burdened 
families in China: unsafe food and air 
pollution, school and job insecurity, and the 
costs of medical care. On top of this they 
must deal with shifting Party attitudes to 
their work. Considerable time and effort are 
dedicated to analysing the local and national 
situation to determine whether a particular 
case, report or activity will cross an invisible 
red line bringing a knock on the door late at 
night. 
For the human rights community, increased 
levels of repression pose three significant 
mental health challenges: managing day-to-
day anxieties; anticipating and preparing for 
the possibility of detention; and responding 
to the use of torture and ill treatment. 
Individuals face varied levels of risk and 
will also react differently to the impact 
of pressure by the authorities. Human 
rights defenders can learn to improve their 
personal security and build their confidence 
in handling police harassment and abuses. 
Courage and preparation, however, will not 
be enough. To sustain the work of the human 
rights community, the mental health costs of 
activism should be understood and addressed. 
Access to Psychological 
Support
A number of NGO staff have turned to 
China’s growing ranks of psychological 
counsellors for help in addressing feelings of 
stress and anxiety. For some the experience 
has been unsatisfactory. In the words of 
one young woman, the counsellor was 
unable to understand her fear of the police. 
To the counsellor such a fear was not only 
outside her realm of experience, but seemed 
irrational. Some counsellors are unwilling 
to help human rights defenders, seemingly 
worried that ‘political sensitivity’ may be 
contagious. There is equally a lack of trust 
on the part of many human rights defenders 
towards mainstream psychologists. Moreover, 
as a service to the wealthier middle classes, 
counselling in China does not come cheap. On 
an NGO salary it would be difficult to afford 
regular sessions.
In recent years small peer support groups 
have started to meet. These gatherings 
provide participants with a psychologically 
safe space to share and work through their 
feelings and experiences. Peer support groups 
are a cost-effective response to the need for 
counselling. They have the added benefit of 
building stronger relationships within the 
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human rights community. Although peer 
support groups lack expertise, by bringing 
people together who have shared experiences, 
they provide an opportunity for participants 
to learn from each other. Several groups now 
integrate attention to mental wellbeing into 
their broader human rights work. 
Experience suggests that peer support 
groups are most effective when group 
facilitators have the chance to continue 
developing their own skills. These include 
not only logistical skills to arrange meetings 
in the current climate, but also how best to 
respond to the varied needs of the group 
and individual members. A simple, but very 
valuable, skill is helping participants learn 
relaxation techniques to help manage stress, 
including deep breathing and visualisation. 
Some activists need to learn to take time 
off and introduce small pleasures into their 
weekly routines.
Many human rights defenders have tried to 
keep their activism separate from family life. 
They believe this will stop spouses or parents 
from worrying and protect their family from 
police pressure. Several years ago, the wife 
of a prominent imprisoned activist described 
a young woman she had met who had no 
knowledge of her husband’s activism. When he 
was detained she was completely unprepared. 
She knew none of his friends, had not met any 
weiquan lawyers and had no idea what to do. 
Peer support groups have encouraged human 
rights defenders to become more open with 
their families and seek their understanding, 
even if they cannot always enjoy their full 
support.
The ‘709’ wives have shown immense 
courage demanding accountability from the 
authorities for the detention of their husbands. 
Together with the Feminist Five, these wives 
have challenged gender stereotypes among 
activists and opened up new opportunities for 
the participation of family members. Strong 
and open relationships among close friends 
and family are needed to sustain activism for 
the long haul. They are also important when 
the frustration experienced by frontline 
human rights defenders may be expressed 
in anger or violence in the home. Support 
group leaders also need to recognise when 
professional help is needed. 
Observation suggests that fostering active 
listening is one of the most important skills 
for facilitators. While activists routinely use 
social media to report threats, beatings or 
other abuses, there are few opportunities to 
talk about the experience and how they felt 
being treated in this way. The development of 
active listening skills has helped survivors of 
police brutality to be able to tell their stories 
in their own words and at their own pace. 
Reflecting on one such conversation, a lawyer 
shared the relief he felt describing in detail, 
for the first time, his experience of being 
detained and beaten by the police: ‘No one 
asked me before how I felt’. 
Surviving Torture and 
Violence
Active listening skills are not only important 
in peer support groups, but also among those 
lawyers whose clients have been tortured 
or subject to other forms of ill treatment. 
Working within the constraints of a brief 
meeting in the detention centre, lawyers are 
often quick to interrupt a conversation and 
offer their opinion. A former detained activist, 
while grateful for several visits from lawyers 
during his thirty-day detention, nevertheless 
complained that the lawyers never really 
listened to him. Improved communication 
skills among lawyers are essential where 
traumatised clients have difficulty recounting 
their experience in the logical manner that 
the law expects. As human rights lawyers 
have become targets of police abuse, forging 
increased mental health awareness is helpful 
on both a professional and personal level. 
Engaging with survivors of torture is a 
particular challenge for support groups. Many 
released prisoners and other human rights 
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defenders have been subjected to torture, but 
there are no specialist rehabilitation services 
in China. Many survivors are also prevented, 
by public security, from travelling abroad 
to meet with psychologists based outside 
mainland China. Members of peer support 
groups can, therefore, be at the forefront in 
engaging with survivors. Sensitisation training 
on the impact of torture, the symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and the risk of 
re-traumatisation is starting to help lawyers 
and other human rights defenders develop 
more psychologically aware communication 
skills. Survivors require sufficient time to 
heal and process their traumatic experience 
before they are encouraged to speak out. 
Human rights lawyers have helped to raise 
awareness of the use of torture. The apparent 
increase in the use of ‘clean’, particularly 
psychological, torture is a direct response to 
growing public disquiet at police violence. 
New legal measures, such as the exclusion 
of illegally obtained evidence, are of little use 
if procurators and judges ignore allegations 
that unbearable psychological pressure was 
applied to secure a confession. Increased 
understanding of the impact of torture will 
help challenge the impunity with which 
interrogators use violence and threats to 
secure the cooperation of detainees.
Overcoming the Divided 
Self
Increased mental health awareness, 
and better skills to handle stress and fear, 
enhance the resilience of human rights 
communities to endure unprecedented 
repression. Recognising the toll on mental 
health experienced by many human rights 
defenders does not ‘pathologise’ dissent. Nor 
is fear of the police in China irrational. And 
greater psychological resilience to withstand 
repression does not normalise police 
brutality. On the contrary, it helps ensure 
that human rights defenders have the inner 
strength to continue challenging police abuse 
and illegality by the authorities. 
Many ordinary citizens in China display 
a divided self in which politically sensitive 
opinions are repressed to allow the 
individual to get on with their life. With 
their commitment to universal values, human 
rights defenders challenge this tension 
between the true self and a public persona 
that supports an increasingly repressive 
Party. Attention to mental wellbeing has 
encouraged greater emotional honesty among 
human rights defenders, and their friends 
and family. It is helping strengthen the 
human rights community through building 
stronger interpersonal networks. Talking 
about feelings helps human rights defenders 
articulate a language of optimism and human 
values in the face of a destructive repression. 
It is the belief in the rightness of their cause 
that helps sustain their work. Those of us 
outside China should ensure that they can 
continue to develop these essential skills and 
support each other at a difficult time. 
Nicola Macbean
Nicola Macbean is the Executive 
Director of The Rights Practice, a 
UK-based NGO that supports those 
working for human rights. Nicola 
has worked closely with Chinese 
lawyers and other human rights 
defenders, and has implemented 
projects helping to combat the use 
of torture and the death penalty.
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In an eloquent and provocative essay 
included in a previous issue of Made in China, 
Eli Friedman analyses the state of the labour 
movement in China, focussing in particular 
on the failure of the institutionalisation 
of collective bargaining. Given the loss of 
political support that collective bargaining 
seems to have experienced in China in recent 
years, Friedman makes an argument for 
replacing it with universal basic income (UBI) 
as a political goal of the labour movement. 
This is not to say that in his opinion collective 
bargaining will disappear or will no longer 
be useful, or that UBI is on the immediate 
horizon; rather, he believes that in the current 
circumstances alternative political goals and 
projects such as UBI should be seriously 
considered, even if they may seem utopian 
for now. 
An Impasse in the Chinese 
Labour Movement
Friedman’s essay provides an occasion 
for serious reconsideration of the goal and 
strategy of the Chinese labour movement. 
This is particularly necessary at a time 
when the activism of Chinese workers 
seems to have reached another impasse due 
to the double challenges of political and 
economic tightening. The movement led 
by Chinese migrant workers is autonomous 
in two senses: it is autonomous in relation 
to the official trade union—the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)—and it 
is also autonomous in that workplace-based 
industrial actions are independent of each 
other. The result is an independent, unco-
opted, but also fractured movement. The 
notion of collective bargaining, one of a few 
clearly articulated goals that are widely-
shared by worker-activists, grassroots labour 
organisations, industrial relations scholars, 
the government, and the ACFTU, has provided 
this highly fragmented movement with a 
sense of direction, bringing together the 
Kevin Lin
The loss of political support for collective 
bargaining has stripped the Chinese labour 
movement of one of its few unifying forces. 
In light of this decline, in a recent essay Eli 
Friedman has argued that collective bargaining 
should be replaced with universal basic income 
(UBI) as a common goal of the movement. But 
would UBI be able to play such a role? What may 
be gained or lost by mobilising around UBI? To 
respond to these questions, this essay compares 
the two strategies with regard to a number of 
crucial aspects.
Collective 
Bargaining or 
Universal Basic 
Income: Which Way 
Forward for Chinese 
Workers?
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efforts of a diversity of individuals, groups, 
and institutions. 
While there is near consensus on the 
importance of collective bargaining for 
Chinese workers, not everyone is in complete 
agreement about the goals of collective 
bargaining or the forms that it should take. 
Some advocate for it to contain labour 
conflicts, others see it as a convenient tool to 
resolve labour disputes, while some hope to 
empower workers. In other words, collective 
bargaining has always been a contested idea, 
but differences have generally not been 
publicly voiced for strategic reasons. Herein 
lies the continual appeal of this strategy 
in debates on Chinese labour over the last 
decade, whether they are among workers, 
scholars, policy-makers, or activists. In 
this sense, the replacement of collective 
bargaining as a legitimate goal may strip the 
movement of one of the few unifying forces. 
Would UBI be able to play a similar or even 
more strategically sound role? What may be 
gained or lost by mobilising around UBI as 
the goal? To respond to these questions, I 
compare the two strategies with regard to a 
number of crucial aspects. 
Workers (Dis)
Empowerment 
How to build workers’ power should be 
at the heart of any strategic consideration. 
Is collective bargaining furthering this 
goal? Scholars have identified two forms of 
collective bargaining: ‘collective bargaining 
by riot’ and ‘party-state-led wage bargaining’. 
These two strategies have divergent goals: 
the former emerges only after workers 
stage collective actions and demand direct 
negotiation with management, and it thus 
contributes to building workers’ collective 
power, confidence, and capacity; the latter 
is an effort led by the party-state to pre-
emptively institutionalise wage bargaining, 
primarily aimed at containing labour conflict. 
While ‘party-state-led wage bargaining’ seems 
reactive at best, and its institutionalisation is 
rarely successful, ‘collective bargaining by 
riot’, beyond the immediate goal of resolving 
workers’ grievances, is a critical practice 
of workers’ self-organisation and self-
governance. 
In contrast, the ability of UBI to build 
workers’ power is less direct. As Friedman 
argues, it may require labour unrest leading 
to ungovernability to bring forward UBI 
as a political compromise, but this does 
not necessarily presuppose worker self-
organisation and self-governance, nor does 
it present obvious opportunities to exercise 
collective power. There is no doubt that 
UBI, if designed and administered well, will 
provide employees with economic security 
and more bargaining power to negotiate 
working conditions, as well as with increased 
freedom and capacity to pursue other social 
and political goals outside employment. 
However, such security and freedom will still 
be threatened by the thorny issues of freedom 
of association and assembly, things that will 
not necessarily be brought forward by UBI. 
In fact, it is not impossible that UBI may 
actually preclude these possibilities. In terms 
of empowering workers, collective bargaining 
seems to hold an advantage over UBI.
Sources of Support
Any goal, if it is to be accepted by the 
movement, will firstly need to be discussed, 
understood, and broadly supported. 
Collective bargaining was able to gain 
acceptance for a number of reasons. First, 
collective bargaining, in the simplest form of 
negotiating with employers, is often a logical 
demand of workers in collective disputes; 
second, it is seen as an inevitable component 
in the mature industrial relations system 
toward which China should be moving; and 
finally, it is broad and ambiguous enough as 
a concept and practice to attract the interest 
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of different constituencies. However, as 
Friedman has described in his essay, belief 
in the adequacy and plausibility of collective 
bargaining has perceptively declined in 
China. At the same time, due to the lack of 
better alternatives, it has been difficult to 
register opposition to it.
In comparison, UBI, while gaining 
momentum globally, is little known and 
discussed in China. Whereas collective 
bargaining has a long history—both positive 
and negative—in industrialised and 
industrialising countries, UBI does not have 
a lot of historical precedents, nor current 
instances of successful adoption beyond 
early local-level experimentations. A recent 
article looking for any UBI-type programme 
in China, cites the example of the minimum 
income guarantee (dibao). Dibao is a welfare 
scheme that is extremely selective in the target 
population of disabled and elderly people, and 
which provides only a very modest income 
supplement. It is unlikely to be expanded in 
the near future, nor, given these limitations, 
is it likely to serve as a good model for UBI. 
Proponents of UBI may thus have to look for 
inspiration elsewhere. This uncertainty over 
what form a Chinese UBI could take, and 
what the effects and consequences would be, 
present a large hurdle for its advocates. 
However, while China’s social welfare 
system is fragmented and unevenly enforced, 
there has been impetus in the last decade 
and a half to improve and expand welfare, in 
contrast to decades of cuts and ideological 
assault in the West. For this reason, an 
extension of the current system to include 
UBI may encounter less resistance in China, 
and could, in fact, even galvanise a movement 
behind it. However, while China should still 
be able to provide a fiscal basis for expanded 
social welfare—despite its slowing economy—
even a small amount per person would be a 
gigantic undertaking for the government, with 
any future debt-crises risking to undermining 
the UBI project altogether. Furthermore, the 
country currently has a low unemployment 
rate and wages have been growing, albeit 
more slowly than in the last decade. Lack 
of employment, which prompts a lot of the 
debate on UBI, is thus arguably not the most 
urgent issue for workers.
Building Momentum
Finally, where would the momentum come 
from? The practice of collective bargaining 
takes place at the workplace, and its 
momentum stems from workers’ collective 
actions within the factories, where the 
pressure is most direct and concentrated. 
Here, workers have the capacity to play a 
direct role in shaping the bargaining process, 
even though the pressure from management 
is enormous. This bottom-up drive is the most 
important reason that ensures the legitimacy 
and longevity of collective bargaining as 
a movement goal. But today, as Friedman 
observes, such momentum seems to be 
slowing down. The manufacturing industry 
is offering less space for industrial workers 
to negotiate wages, and we often see workers 
simply demanding severance pay due to 
factory closure or relocation, without getting 
a chance to negotiate for better salaries or 
labour conditions. The political tightening 
over civil society organisations, lawyers, 
individual labour activists, and even people 
who were merely documenting protests, 
constrains the transfer of experience and 
knowledge, undermining the very foundation 
of the support for collective bargaining. 
In comparison, UBI is a policy instrument 
that is designed by and negotiated at the 
highest echelons of the party-state, where 
workers cannot exercise direct power or 
influence. In the past, the ACFTU might have 
played a role in lobbying for the protective 
Labour Contract Law, and it is still possible 
that under the right circumstances it may 
choose to advocate for better welfare 
policies or even UBI. In these scenarios, 
would workers be able to have any say in a 
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UBI initiative, or would they have to rely 
on the official union or other bureaucratic 
actors? Moreover, we are no longer simply 
talking about migrant workers in industrial 
workplaces: UBI will and must necessarily 
be a national debate, encompassing broad 
sections of the population, across sectors, 
regions, and employment categories. It may 
take a social movement broader than only 
workers to advocate for UBI, the building of 
which is a task as exciting as it is challenging.
A Golden Age Remnant
Where does this leave us? Faith in collective 
bargaining is evidently in crisis. Enterprise 
bargaining, if it happens at all, is rarely 
sustained over time. Any attempt to move 
beyond enterprise bargaining, toward sectoral 
or regional wage setting and bargaining, 
has not seen much success besides in a few 
celebrated cases—for example in Zhejiang 
province. Recently, there also has been a more 
radical rethinking of working-class formation 
in Asia. It may be argued that the kind of trade 
union movement under which collective 
bargaining is institutionalised is unique to the 
golden age of post-war capitalism in the early-
industrialised countries. At a time when trade 
unionism and collective bargaining have been 
in serious decline for decades in the West, it 
is reasonable to reconsider this strategy.
Still, collective bargaining remains relevant. 
For the foreseeable future, industrial workers 
in China will surely continue to demand 
to bargain collectively with management, 
whatever form these negotiations may take. 
While it should not be the only goal, it 
should still serve as a legitimate instrument 
in industrial relations, particularly in order 
to build collective capacity. There is also a 
distinct possibility that interest in collective 
bargaining will be rekindled, with the issue 
returning to the political agenda, in the 
event of a successful bargaining after an 
unexpected, socially significant strike—and 
almost all prominent strikes of the last decade 
in China have been unexpected. 
However, the limit of enterprise bargaining 
is clear, and at best this should only be 
an intermediary goal. It may be useful to 
revisit sectoral and industry-wide collective 
bargaining as an alternative, or as the next 
step in a wider collective action strategy. Or, 
it may be strategic as a movement to combine 
such goals with advocacy for specific 
legal changes, such as strengthening anti-
retaliation measures to protect workers who 
complain about illegal working conditions, 
or imposing criminal sanctions and personal 
liability for employers. No single goal is likely 
to be sufficient, nor is it likely to gain the 
approval of all participants in the movement. 
In fact, collective bargaining, UBI, and the 
other approaches outlined here may well be 
complementary to one another. At the current 
impasse, critical engagement with a range of 
goals and strategies will better inform the 
labour movement’s strategies, providing it 
with coherence and direction.
Kevin Lin
Kevin Lin is China Programme 
Officer at the International Labor 
Rights Forum. His research interests 
focus on labour and employment 
relations in China’s state sector, and 
China’s labour movement and civil 
society.
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Jenny Chan
In January 2017, Apple celebrated the tenth 
anniversary of the launch of the first model of the 
iPhone. After a decade, has Apple’s extraordinary 
profitability been coupled with any greater 
social responsibility? Are the Chinese workers 
who produce the most lucrative product in the 
electronics world seeing improved working and 
living conditions? This essay provides some 
answers by focussing on two issues: freedom of 
association and the situation of student interns. 
#iSlaveat10
On 9 January 2017, Apple celebrated the 
tenth anniversary of the iPhone’s debut 
with an event entitled ‘iPhone at Ten: The 
Revolution Continues’. Since its launch 
in 2007, the iPhone has remained the 
company’s flagship product and biggest 
income generator. In 2016, nearly two-thirds 
of Apple’s revenue came from sales of the 
smartphone. The iPhone is supposed to be 
revolutionising not only mobile phones, but 
also corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
In 2015, when Time magazine crowned 
Apple CEO Tim Cook as one of the world’s 
one hundred most influential people, writer 
John Lewis hailed Cook’s ability to push 
Apple to ‘unimaginable profitability—and 
greater social responsibility’. What he 
did not mention was the reality of social 
irresponsibility confronting Chinese workers 
who make Apple products.
When discussing the labour rights abuses 
associated with the production of the iPhone, 
the name that continually resurfaces is that 
of the Taiwanese-owned Foxconn Technology 
Group (hereafter Foxconn). Its collaboration 
with Apple started back in 2002, as the 
company was on its way to becoming China’s 
leading exporter of high-tech electronics. 
Initially, Foxconn was contracted to build 
Macs and iPods. Then, in 2007, the contract 
was extended to include the first-generation 
of iPhones. In 2010, when Foxconn was 
confronted by a spate of worker suicides 
in its factories in Shenzhen, the company 
was the sole maker of iPhones. After this, 
however, Apple—following the common 
practice of pitting suppliers against each 
other to maximise profit—shifted some of its 
production to Pegatron, another Taiwanese-
owned supplier where labour costs are 
allegedly even lower.
Since 22 September 2017, Apple has been 
selling iPhone 8—‘a new generation of iPhone’, 
as they market it—on the global markets. 
Has Apple’s ‘unimaginable profitability’ 
been coupled with any ‘greater social 
responsibility’? Are the Chinese workers who 
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produce the most profitable product in the 
electronic world seeing improved working and 
living conditions? In this essay, I will attempt 
to provide some answers with a specific focus 
on two issues: freedom of association and the 
situation of ‘student interns’. 
Freedom of Association 
Denied
The Apple Supplier Code of Conduct 
explicitly highlights the rights to freedom 
of association and collective bargaining. 
Unfortunately, although codes of conduct 
produced by many multinational companies 
and industry associations pledge to honour 
workers’ rights to form trade unions, in China 
the process is dominated by management in 
the workplace, and is ultimately controlled 
by the state through the branches of the only 
trade union whose existence is allowed in the 
country, the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU). 
Foxconn’s resistance to any call for union 
democracy emerged in several instances. This 
was particularly evident in the wake of a riot 
that erupted at a Foxconn plant in Taiyuan, 
Shanxi province, at the end of September 
2012. In that case, the fury of the workers 
was triggered by their exasperation with 
company policies. In the months leading up 
to the release of the iPhone 5, they had only 
one day off a month. Also contributing to 
their grievances was the militaristic security 
imposed by the company at the male workers’ 
dormitory. When company guards beat two 
workers for failing to show their staff IDs, 
and kicked them until they fell to the ground, 
the workers reached a breaking point. To deal 
with the fallout, Foxconn announced ‘a special 
day off ’ for all eighty thousand workers and 
staff at the facility. On the same day that the 
riot occurred, Tim Cook assured the world 
that retail stores would ‘continue to receive 
iPhone 5 shipments regularly and customers 
[would be able to] continue to order online 
and receive an estimated delivery date’. 
But as international news media published 
articles with blaring headlines like ‘China 
Apple Factory Riot’ and ‘Riot Reported at 
Apple Partner Manufacturer Foxconn’s 
iPhone 5 Plant’, Apple was compelled to 
reassure consumers around the world that 
it was not running sweatshops. It was then, 
amidst the factory-wide riot, that a twenty-
one-year-old worker wrote an open letter to 
Foxconn’s Chief Executive. The letter ended 
with the following words: ‘Please remember, 
from now on, to reassess the responsibilities 
of the company union so that genuine trade 
unions can play an appropriate role’. Still, 
even on that occasion, this bottom-up demand 
was completely ignored by the company 
management.
While over the years there have been union 
elections at Foxconn, these initiatives have 
been mostly a formality to demonstrate 
Foxconn’s supposed commitment to Apple’s 
CSR principles. In an interview with a 
Foxconn worker in March 2015, I asked about 
the union election that had taken place earlier 
that year:
Not many workers knew about the company 
union elections. The promotional posters 
were placed in the dark corners in the 
factory. The management did not do it for 
our information. They did it to complete the 
standard process only. 
On several occasions, supervisors 
manipulated the elections by explicitly 
instructing workers to cast their votes 
for designated candidates. Out of fear of 
retaliation, workers followed the managerial 
instructions. As one worker candidly admitted 
to me: 
We’re asked by our supervisors to check 
the right box. What’s laughable is that all 
the candidates are complete strangers to me. 
Afterwards, I checked the information about 
the winner, and found out that he’s a senior 
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manager from the same department [as me]! 
But I’ve never heard of him. I believe that all 
the winners were handpicked by the senior 
management.
In the words of another worker: ‘After all, we 
have no idea who’s running for the elections. 
Perhaps only our boss knows about them!’ 
This does not mean that workers are not 
aspiring to have their own organisations. In 
the course of my multi-year research project, 
Foxconn workers have repeatedly made calls 
for democratising the company union. I argue 
that having a democratic, representative trade 
union, instead of a management-dominated 
one, is critical to ensure workers’ rights. 
Student Workers at 
Foxconn
 
Without independent labour representation, 
for years Foxconn has been able to get away 
with using ‘student interns’ who are not 
legally recognised as employees, and are 
often forced by their schools to work at the 
company’s plants. In 2010, following China’s 
economic recovery from the global financial 
crisis, 28,044 student interns from over two 
hundred technical and vocational schools all 
over China were assigned to the integrated 
Digital Product Business Group (iDPBG)—a 
Foxconn business group that exclusively 
serves Apple—to work alongside Foxconn 
employees in Shenzhen. This was a six-
fold increase from the 4,539 interns who, 
according to Foxconn’s internal magazine, 
had been assigned to Foxconn’s Shenzhen 
plants in 2007. During the summer of 2010, 
Foxconn employed 150,000 student interns 
nationwide—15 per cent of its entire million-
strong Chinese workforce.
In recent years, China’s leaders have 
sought to boost labour productivity through 
expanded investment in vocational training. 
The number of vocational high school 
students doubled from 11.7 million in 2001 
to 22.4 million in 2010, even as regular 
high schools still enrolled a larger number 
of students than vocational high schools 
nationwide. Vocational schools follow a work-
study model that emphasises the integration 
of education with production, as stated in 
China’s 1996 Vocational Education Law. 
They offer employment-oriented courses for 
eligible applicants who have completed nine 
years of schooling. The official goal for 2020 
is to recruit 23.5 million students—50 per 
cent of the nation’s senior secondary student 
population—into three-year vocational 
programmes.
In this, Foxconn saw an opportunity to 
exploit student interns. A 2011 company 
statement claimed: ‘Foxconn cooperates 
with vocational schools to provide students 
with practical skills training that will enable 
them to find employment after they graduate 
from these programmes’. But Foxconn has 
said nothing either about the contents of 
its training programmes, nor about its skill 
evaluation methods. Working hand in glove 
with local governments, Foxconn has simply 
violated China’s internship regulations 
designed to protect students and assure that 
their career needs are served. 
In the words of a sixteen-year-old Foxconn 
student intern whom I interviewed in 2011:
Come on, what do you think we’ve learned 
standing for more than ten hours a day 
manning machines on the line? What’s an 
internship? There’s no relation to what we 
study in school. Every day is just a repetition 
of one or two simple motions, like a robot.
To this day, the company not only recruits 
students regardless of their field of study, 
it also routinely recruits them much earlier 
than is legally allowed, while they are still 
in their first or second year, rather than 
their final year of vocational school. Even 
worse, these so-called internships are often 
extended from three months to a full year to 
meet production needs, with scant regard for 
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the students’ training needs.
Under mounting pressure, in 2016, the 
central government finally took some measures 
to protect the basic rights of student interns. 
Vocational schools were instructed to manage 
student internships in accordance with new 
regulations that came into force on 11 April 
2016, superseding the 2007 Administrative 
Measures. Under this new regulatory regime, 
the duration of workplace-based internships 
should not exceed six months. Moreover, 
the regulations not only require that student 
internships provide substantial educational 
content and work-skill training, but also 
mandate comprehensive labour protections 
for student interns, such as eight-hour 
working days, no overtime and no night 
shifts. Above all, no more than 10 per cent 
of the labour force at ‘any given facility’, or 
no more than 20 per cent of the workers in 
‘any given work position’, should consist of 
student interns at any point in time. 
However, in spite of these legal 
improvements, the government has left intact 
incentives for corporations to continue to 
prioritise internship programmes as sources 
of cheap labour. With the passage of the 
2016 Regulations, the statutory minimum 
level for paying interns is clearly specified: 
‘Wages shall be at least 80 per cent of that of 
employees during the probationary period’. 
In other words, employers are still permitted 
to give student interns only 80 per cent of the 
income offered to full employees on the job, 
whether or not students’ productivity is less. 
Ten Years On, the 
Campaign Continues
Global supply chains are not benign 
spaces of transnational trade. While rooted 
in local terrains, proliferating labour 
struggles in China have to simultaneously 
confront forces of global capitalism and the 
Chinese state. Workers are protesting and 
striking, labour rights groups are issuing 
statements demanding that corporations 
accept responsibility for worker abuses, and 
engaged scholars are analysing the structures 
of domination that drive labour control and 
eventually spark resistance. In solidarity with 
Chinese workers and student interns, and in an 
attempt to focus the spotlight on the ongoing 
illegal practices of Foxconn, Hong Kong-
based advocacy group Students and Scholars 
Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM) 
has marked 2017 as the year of the global 
anti-sweatshop campaign ‘#iSlaveat10—No 
More iSlave’. 
However, in spite of these transnational 
initiatives, the most important driving force 
for change remains the workers themselves. 
The current protests in localised and 
dispersed sites of resistance across China need 
to develop further through intra- and inter-
class lines and across the urban-rural divide, 
growing into a more broadly based social 
movement. It is the evolving consciousness 
and praxis of the new generation of Chinese 
workers that will shape the future of China 
and global capitalism.
Jenny Chan
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FOCUS
Chinese Labour 
in a Global 
Perspective
Zheng Yu 
Chris Smith
As the scale and scope of Chinese investment in 
Europe increases, it is important to understand 
how Chinese multinational corporations 
organise their workplaces on the continent, and 
what this entails for their workforce. This essay 
examines three key issues: the level of Chinese 
investment in comparison to investment from 
other countries; the extent to which employment 
models developed in China are transferable 
to European workplaces; and whether or not 
Chinese firms prefer using home practices to 
manage their workforce in Europe.
Chinese 
Multinational 
Corporations in 
Europe: Racing to 
the Bottom?
The arrival of Chinese firms in Europe has 
elicited both excitement and anxiety. New 
investors with funding from the Chinese 
state present a challenge to an open market 
in crisis and to Europe’s faltering welfare 
capitalism model. A typical narrative depicts 
Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) 
as exploiting institutional loopholes, and 
undermining local laws, regulations, and 
norms. In terms of employment relations, a 
widespread concern is that labour standards 
may be lowered by those Chinese MNCs that 
break rules on working hours and health and 
safety; use coercive forms of labour control, 
including withholding wages to inhibit 
mobility, and taking deposits to control 
migrant workers; ignore or suppress trade 
unions; and pay wages below subsistence 
levels, including through the employment 
of prison labour on construction and civil 
engineering projects. A further concern 
is that employment practices adopted by 
Chinese firms will influence the way that non-
Chinese MNCs and local firms manage their 
workforce, with the fear that Europe will see 
a deterioration in working conditions across 
the board. However, despite such negative 
speculation, we actually know very little 
about what it is like to work in Chinese MNCs. 
As the scale and scope of Chinese investment 
increases, we need to better understand how 
Chinese MNCs organise their workplaces in 
Europe, and what this means for labour on 
the continent. 
To avoid an over-simplistic reading of 
the impact of Chinese investment on work 
and employment in Europe, this essay will 
examine three key questions. First, we 
ask how influential Chinese investment is 
in comparison to investment from other 
countries. Focussing on this question allows 
us to evaluate the ability of firms to introduce 
employment practices from their home 
country to the host society. Second, we ask to 
what extent employment models developed 
in China are transferable to the European 
workplaces. Addressing this question will 
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help determine the appropriate methods for 
studying Chinese firms overseas. Third, we 
question whether Chinese firms prefer using 
home practices to manage their workforce in 
Europe. Exploring this final issue prompts us 
to consider the various options Chinese firms 
have when it comes to deciding employment 
practices to be adopted in foreign countries.  
Debating Foreign Direct 
Investment
The debates on how foreign direct investment 
(FDI) may reshape employment relations in 
Europe are nothing new. In the 1960s and 
1970s, there were similar speculations over 
the ‘Americanisation’ of European businesses. 
Likewise, in the 1980s and early 1990s, when 
Japanese firms challenged American firms in 
becoming the main source of FDI, there was 
intense discussion about the ‘Japanisation’ 
of the manufacturing industry in Europe. In 
both previous waves of FDI, the perceived 
transformation of employment relations 
was at heart of the debates. Although there 
were criticisms of the intensification of work 
pressure, there was also a sense that European 
companies needed to learn from the much 
more celebrated employment models that 
contributed to the American and Japanese 
companies’ success overseas. 
Compared to American and Japanese 
companies, Chinese firms have never been the 
single dominant force of capital expansion. 
The total stock of Chinese outward foreign 
direct Investment (OFDI) accounts for just 
4.9 per cent of the worldwide OFDI stock 
and one fifth of American OFDI stock by end 
of 2016. It is true that the scale of Chinese 
investment overseas has grown rapidly in 
the past ten years, at an average rate of 40 
per cent, and that the outward flow of FDI 
from China as a proportion of the total OFDI 
flow worldwide has expanded at a steady 
pace (see Figure 1). Together with American 
OFDI (light blue line) and the Japanese OFDI 
(green line), Chinese OFDI (dark blue line) 
has become one of the major sources of capital 
flow worldwide. Within the European Union’s 
(EU) twenty-eight countries, however, China 
accounted for just over 2 per cent of the 
FDI inflow in 2015 and 1 per cent of total 
FDI stock by the end of 2015 (see Figure 2). 
Given that the scale of Chinese investment in 
Europe remains relatively small, we would 
expect Chinese firms to exercise control 
and influence over employment practices 
at workplace level, rather than having large 
scale impact on employment relations at 
national or cross-national level.    
* The calculation 
German OFDI before 
1990 was based on 
data from the Federal 
Republic of Germany
** The figure for 2016 
is end of year data 
rather than the three-
year average 
Figure 1 
Country-based OFDI as a Percentage of World Total OFDI  (flow, three-year average)
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD’s statistical data on global outward FDI
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Differentiated Foreign 
Employment Practices
It must be assumed that any new 
employment practices introduced by Chinese 
firms will be contested by local workers 
and their representatives by referring to 
the local ‘norms’ of employment relations. 
Moreover, given that China is a less advanced 
economy with a smaller collective force of 
investors in Europe, employment practices 
exercised by rival MNCs from other 
countries may be used by Chinese firms as 
key references to effectively manage the local 
workforce. Therefore, studying the impact 
of Chinese investment on local employment 
relations will need to take into account the 
application of established practices, as well 
as experimentation with emergent practices 
in the new regional spaces of differentiated 
European labour markets. 
This prompts the question of whether there 
is a set of Chinese indigenous employment 
practices that could potentially be used as 
a model for Chinese MNCs moving into the 
European market for the first time. China’s 
move from a socialist to a capitalist state has 
passed through several experimental stages, 
and has embraced a number of developmental 
models. As a result, there are significant 
differences in the way Chinese firms 
manage their workforce. Many state-owned 
companies have maintained some legacy of 
the old Chinese socialist personnel system, 
which means that the terms of employment 
are based on a mixture of permanent, 
contractual, and ad hoc labour relations. 
Private companies and foreign investment 
companies have developed their employment 
practices in response to transitions in labour 
markets. For this reason, employment 
practices of Chinese MNCs are typically 
fragmented, adopting elements of modern 
human resource management, continued 
paternalism, and coercive labour control. 
In addition to ownership-based differences, 
geographical differences in labour market 
conditions have facilitated sub-national 
employment models to emerge. For 
example, the ‘Guangdong model’ is based on 
manufacturing contractors employing mainly 
migrant workers and supplying owners of 
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Figure 2 
Top Ten Countries as Source of FDI into the EU (flow, three-year average)
Source: Compiled from 
Eurostat’s data on FDI in 
Europe
28
international brands. Firms adopting this 
model engage in OFDI by acquiring supplier or 
client firms in the global production network. 
In contrast, the ‘Wenzhou model’ has relied 
on small family ties and personal networks 
to generate growth and to accumulate funds 
for investing overseas. We cannot really say 
that there is a single or dominant model that 
has been adopted by Chinese MNCs abroad. 
For this reason, a firm-focussed approach 
is more likely to offer insights on why 
certain employment practices were adopted, 
modified, or abandoned.   
The Myth of National 
Models
Whenever a new player enters the 
international space we should avoid 
overemphasising the employment models 
employed by their compatriots and instead 
focus more on the choices made by the 
individual firms themselves. Among Chinese 
firms in Europe, we can see that certain 
firms may be in favour of adopting some 
of their home practices especially those 
firms that are under wage, labour supply, 
or consumer market pressures in China. 
However, it is also true that some Chinese 
firms’ internationalisation is of a more hybrid 
nature, aiming to perpetuate employment 
practices which prevail in China, as well as 
replicating ‘successful’ experiences of other 
firms in the new host territory. In particular, 
when firms are able to secure continued access 
to a pool of inexpensive and well-trained 
Chinese workers, they can bring much of their 
workforce overseas through an intra-firm 
transfer system allowed by some European 
countries’ immigration policy. For instance, 
Huawei, a major Chinese telecommunications 
firm and a forerunner in terms of investment 
in Europe, demonstrates the benefits of 
sourcing a young labour force from China. 
Controlled by a performance reward system 
administrated and remunerated by the 
parent firm, the workforce is hardworking, 
motivated, and efficient. 
However, firms like Huawei are exceptional 
cases, and employing a Chinese workforce in 
Europe may be a temporary phase. Changes 
in labour costs, productivity, and other 
labour market conditions in the future will 
undoubtedly trigger reassessment of such 
employment practices. Additionally, pressure 
from local trade unions, the media, and 
the general public has the ability to force 
Chinese firms to rethink their employment 
policies and assess the possibility of targeting 
alternative sources of labour. 
New entrants into a country can also operate 
in a space where employment practices can 
be implemented with less local pressure. This 
is particularly true in some special economic 
zones, where exceptions are given by the host 
country as an incentive to attract foreign 
investors. However, employment terms may 
or may not be included in such exceptions and 
can be subject to change, requiring firms to 
search for viable alternatives to the practices 
they are used to. This point can be illustrated 
by the case of China Shipping Group’s 
investment in upgrading two container 
terminals in the Greek port of Piraeus. At 
the beginning of the rebuilding project, 
the firm recruited Chinese construction 
workers. However, the local dockworkers 
union organised several rounds of strikes, 
demanding the termination of any hiring 
practices that denied local workers’ access 
to work. In response, the firm withdrew the 
majority of Chinese workers, replacing them 
not with local Greek workers, but instead 
with migrant workers from within the EU 
hired through employment agencies. The aim 
was to maintain a flexible supply of labour 
and to exclude local union members from the 
workforce. This example points to the fact 
that on-going industrial conflict might lead 
to further changes in employment practices. 
Firms operating in a space created outside 
local norms can change the ‘rules of the game’ 
and their ability to transcend such norms 
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cannot be overstated. In regional labour 
markets, targeting EU migrant workers 
is a common practice of firms in sectors 
characterised by intense cost competition—
such as construction, logistics, and services. 
It is also possible that some Chinese firms 
invest in Europe in an attempt to move 
away from home-country practices and thus 
develop new ways of working in host societies. 
Especially in more developed economies, the 
incentives for investment from Chinese MNCs 
are often linked to upgrading technological 
and management capabilities, seeking novelty 
in products and services, and improving the 
way work is organised. Because of this, they 
try to maintain subsidiary autonomy and 
some stability by focussing on organisation, 
development, and learning. This trend is 
reflected in the composition of Chinese MNC 
investments in Europe, with merger and 
acquisition (M&A) having become in recent 
years a major mode of Chinese MNCs entering 
Europe (see Figure 3 below). 
For instance, Volvo Cars, a Swedish 
automobile manufacturer acquired by Geely, 
is one of the cases where most existing 
employment practices have been maintained 
as the Chinese acquirer attempts to improve 
their market position, productivity, and 
management know-how by learning from 
the more developed subsidiary firm. For 
Chinese MNCs undertaking large-scale 
M&As, it makes sense to incorporate existing 
employment practices, at least in the short-
term—particularly if they see the acquired 
European subsidiary as having the potential 
to be key contributor to future revenue, a 
source of advanced technology, or a model 
management system. 
Rethinking the ‘China 
Model’ of OFDI
The examples highlighted in this essay 
suggest that it is misleading to depict Chinese 
Figure 3 
Entry Modes of Chinese Investment in the EU
Source: Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, and Schüller, 2017
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MNCs as being exporters of lower labour 
standards from China to Europe. In fact, 
Chinese firms in Europe are diverse in the way 
they engage with the local workforce. This is 
because Chinese firms have followed multiple 
routes of developments and their motives 
for internationalisation vary. Employment 
practices that seem to have been brought in 
by the Chinese firms evolve and transform in 
workplaces in Europe. Against a background 
of casualisation of employment relations 
with the resurgence of neo-liberalism across 
European labour markets, new entrants 
(Chinese firms) have found more space to 
negotiate with existing institutional players 
(national states, trade unions, employment 
agents) to develop divergent employment 
practices.  
Research elsewhere shows that Chinese 
firms are extremely pragmatic, adaptive, and 
willing to work with local institutions. For 
example, Chinese firms are found to take a 
practical approach in resolving industrial 
confrontations in some developing countries, 
changing remuneration policies in response 
to local workers’ opposition to practices such 
as continuous overtime and flexible working. 
While Chinese managers are often seen as 
championing ‘job insecurity, hard-work and 
self-sacrifice’ as key to China’s economic 
success, they show strong sensitivity to the 
country conditions as well. When engaged 
in engineering and construction projects in 
developing countries, Chinese firms tend 
to emphasise the relevance of management 
practices and applicability of past experiences 
to new situations. 
To understand the complex impact of 
Chinese investment in Europe, future 
research would do well to examine more 
fully the dynamics and diversity in the 
way Chinese firms manage their overseas 
workforces. Much more research is needed 
to see how Chinese MNCs negotiated with 
various institutional players for workforce 
composition, working conditions, and 
employment terms. Ethnographic case studies 
are most likely to enrich our understanding 
on this front. In addition, comparative case 
studies across a range of sectors and countries 
will also be useful to allow us to uncover what 
underpins the Chinese firms’ ability to access 
labour and mobilise workers. 
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Chinese-established special economic zones 
in Laos have been criticised as being sites of 
neoliberal exception, sustained by a Chinese 
logic of self-entrepreneurship and self-
determination—or a soft version of colonial-era 
extraterritoriality. This essay argues that such 
areas are, in fact, a frontier space of post-socialist 
ad hoc experimentation, within which the Lao 
state haphazardly tests new socioeconomic and 
governing mechanisms under authoritarian 
rule in order to produce revenue and perpetuate 
its power over Lao citizens and territory. 
Liquid Labourscape: 
Ad Hoc Experimentation 
in a Chinese Special 
Economic Zone in Laos
In the northwest corner of Laos, where 
the confluence of the Ruak and the Mekong 
rivers marks the border with Myanmar and 
Thailand, lies the Golden Triangle Special 
Economic Zone (GTSEZ). This is one of twelve 
special and specific economic zones across 
Laos, all of which are areas where Chinese 
investments feature prominently. The GTSEZ 
was established in 2007 on a ninety-nine-year 
land concession of three thousand hectares 
granted by the Lao government to Golden 
Kapok, a private Chinese firm owned by Mr. 
Zhao Wei, a casino tycoon from Heilongjiang 
province. Amounting to 700 million USD as 
of 2015, the firm’s investment resulted in the 
construction of a new conurbation whose 
economy revolves around the casino business. 
The Lao government and the foreign company 
jointly rule the area. In this essay I will draw 
on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in 
2010 and 2015 in order to explore how this 
new governance model has affected labour 
dynamics in the zone, and to shed new light 
on the alliance between Chinese capital and 
the Upper Mekong states. 
A Frontier Space of 
Post-Socialist Ad Hoc 
Experimentation
Chinese-established SEZs in Laos have 
recently been at the centre of media and 
scholarly debate. Two main analyses have 
emerged in academic literature. One, put 
forward by Santasombat Yos, draws on Aihwa 
Ong’s previous work and defines the GTSEZ 
as a site of neoliberal exception, sustained 
by a Chinese logic of self-entrepreneurship 
and self-determination. This is coupled with 
‘state socialism from afar’, which has caused 
deprivation and disempowerment of Lao 
people through a process of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. The other, represented by Pál 
Nyíri, sees the land concessions granted to 
Chinese companies for SEZs in Laos as a soft 
version of colonial-era extraterritoriality, 
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The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone is 
located in northwest Laos, on the border with 
Myanmar and Thailand. Photo: Patrick Truscott, 
Flickr
*Antonella is grateful to Josto Luzzu for providing 
logistic support and research assistance during her 
fieldwork in 2015.
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and criticise them for eroding ‘the boundaries 
of citizenship’. 
My research suggests that neither the 
neoliberal nor the crypto-colonial soft-
extraterritoriality view fully captures 
the current political and socio-economic 
dynamics of the GTSEZ. The former arbitrarily 
applies a universal neoliberal framework 
to the Lao and Chinese authoritarian post-
socialist contexts; the latter, underestimates 
that shared sovereignty has been an on-going 
governance pattern in the Upper Mekong 
since pre-colonial times (Diana 2009). 
Drawing on interviews with different actors 
within the GTSEZ, participant observation 
of the lived labour experiences of residents, 
and an analysis of official documents from 
the Lao government, I argue that the GTSEZ 
is, in fact, a frontier space of post-socialist 
ad hoc experimentation. In it, the Lao state 
haphazardly tests new socioeconomic and 
governing mechanisms under authoritarian 
rule in order to produce revenue, and renew 
and perpetuate its power over Lao citizens 
and territory. 
Evidence of this post-socialist experimental 
approach can be found in official documents 
produced by the Lao government. In these 
bureaucratic texts, SEZs are described as 
sites for testing a new modernisation and 
industrialisation model by attracting both 
domestic and foreign investment with the aim 
of integrating Laos into the regional economy. 
SEZs are subjected to special investment 
promotion policies and have autonomous 
economic, financial, and legal systems. In 
the GTSEZ, the experimental policies are 
implemented by a Management Board and 
an Executive Board, each constituted by 
Lao state officials at different levels and 
representatives from the Chinese firm. The 
boards are charged with jointly planning 
development interventions, issuing and 
enforcing regulations, as well as managing 
the zone on a daily basis. However, the zone’s 
administration and management remain 
under the ultimate supervision of the Lao 
national government. 
However, both a 2012 official report by 
the Lao government and later indiscretions 
from employees in the zone’s administration 
during my fieldwork in 2015, reveal that the 
zone’s experimentation was dysfunctional 
and ad hoc when put into practice. More than 
the subjugation of Laos to Chinese interests, 
the operation of the GTSEZ was tinged 
with illiberal and authoritarian undertones 
from the Lao state, a situation that belied 
the ‘neoliberal’ and ‘crypto-colonial’ views 
described above. Day-to-day co-ruling 
unfolded through on-going frictions over 
decision-making between the Chinese and Lao 
counterparts, as well as through obstruction 
by the Lao government of the Chinese firm’s 
plans. It was rumoured that high-level Lao 
officials kept Mr. Zhao in check by constantly 
asking for money in return for concessions on 
project advancement. The committees’ lack of 
administrative capacity contributed to casual 
and chaotic governance. This kind of ad hoc 
rule allowed the Lao government to secure its 
sovereignty over the zone.
Liquid Labourscape
The inconsistency between political 
rhetoric and socio-economic reality was 
also manifested in the labour sphere. A Lao 
prime ministerial decree from 2010 indicates 
that SEZs should create employment for the 
zone’s residents and allow them to have a 
sustainable income. The Lao Labour Law, 
amended in 2013, and the new Law on 
Investment Promotion of 2009, in theory, 
guarantee a number of labour rights and 
regulate the investors’ activities. However, 
my empirical research found that in the 
unstable administration of the GTSEZ, 
these legal resolutions were arbitrarily or 
barely enforced. Ad hoc experimentation 
produced what I call a ‘liquid labourscape’, a 
labour scenario characterised by inequality, 
casualisation, and lack of regulation—
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especially on matters concerning rights and 
safety. 
In the GTSEZ’s liquid labourscape, Chinese 
investors’ treatment and remuneration of 
labourers was unequal and informed by 
a discourse of productivity that reflected 
an evolutionary view of socioeconomic 
development, tinged with racism, whereby 
nationals from ‘more developed’ countries 
were framed as more productive and 
therefore more-deserving than nationals 
from ‘less developed’ states. At the top of 
the wage-labour hierarchy stood the twenty-
seven Ukrainians and one Russian who 
worked at the casino as VIP room managers, 
supervisors, and, in one case, as a receptionist. 
By virtue of being Europeans—and thus being 
presumed to have a higher level of civilisation 
and skills—they received salaries that ranged 
between 1,000 to 1,200 USD. Below them 
were around 1,000 to 1,500 mainland Chinese. 
Considered to be the most hard-working, 
rule-abiding, smartest, and civilised among 
the Asian employees, they were employed as 
skilled labourers in the casino, taking care 
of hospitality, recreation, or administration. 
Given their perceived higher ‘quality’ (suzhi), 
they received monthly salaries that varied 
between 600–800 USD. Lower in the hierarchy 
were the Thai employees, considered to be 
rule-abiding and relatively civilised, followed 
by the Lao, who were regarded as lazy, 
uncivilised, and stupid. Finally, at the bottom 
were the Burmese, viewed as hard-working 
and submissive, yet coming from a poor 
country and having dark skin. Only 40 Lao, a 
dozen Thai, and a couple of hundred Burmese 
workers were employed at the casino as 
croupiers, receiving wages of about 100 USD 
a month. A dozen of the Lao employees, who 
worked as interpreters, middlemen, or clerks 
in the zone’s administration or in the casino, 
earned between 200–300 USD per month. 
About 400 Burmese performed unskilled jobs, 
such as gardening, cleaning, waitressing, and 
construction, for salaries ranging between 
70–100 USD a month. 
Although the Lao Labour Law sets the 
daily working time limit to eight hours and 
guarantees one day of rest per week, most 
employees worked for ten to twelve hours a 
day and had only two unpaid days of leave per 
month. With the exception of the Europeans, 
none of the employees in the casino or in other 
service sectors in the zone had employment 
contracts. Most worked short-term, without 
life or health insurance. Many interviewees 
complained about being mistreated and forced 
to work overtime by their Chinese employers. 
Indeed, labour conditions within the zone did 
not differ much from those found elsewhere 
in Laos. The Lao state officials’ loose or 
lack of control contributed to reducing the 
gap between the GTSEZ and the rest of the 
country. These dynamics confirm that Laos’ 
SEZs are not zones of neoliberal exception, 
but rather spaces of ‘normalised’ post-
socialist inequality and lack of rule of law.
Strategies of Survival: 
Resistance, Resilience, and 
Reinvention
Paradoxically, the liquid nature of the 
zone’s labourscape enabled residents to 
devise creative modes of survival. These 
took the form of resistance, resilience, and 
reinvention. Expressions of resistance to the 
Chinese-Lao joint rule came from many Lao 
citizens who resided in or around the Zone. 
One such case can be seen in the actions of 
the residents of Khuam, a village that had 
been relocated in 2008 in order to make 
space for the construction of the Zone’s 
business neighbourhood—a move that left a 
few without land and jobs. In 2014, residents 
gathered on the streets to demonstrate 
against the committees’ proposal to take 
more land for the construction of an airport. 
Although the Lao Army cracked down on the 
demonstrators, the protest was successful in 
halting the airport plan. The government’s 
backlash notwithstanding, dissent continued 
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in a concealed way in virtual and real life. A 
Lao man showed me a Facebook page where 
netizens exchanged satirical pictures and 
posts that contested Chinese investments in 
Laos, and even mentioned an uprising being 
organised by overseas Lao to free Laos from 
the yoke of Chinese investment. In general, 
except for the few Zone employees mentioned 
above, Lao residents refused to work for the 
Chinese due to the long working hours and 
discrimination that this involved. 
Additionally, several locals demonstrated 
their resilience to land and labour deprivation. 
Many started to learn Chinese language 
or send their children to study in China, 
in order to accrue a ‘cultural capital’ that 
could help them profit from the newcomers. 
A few established social connections with 
the Chinese, which in some cases resulted 
in love affairs or marriages, and in others 
turned into business collaborations. A few 
other Lao locals ventured into independent 
small business to capitalise on the Chinese 
presence. For instance, Sai, a Lao middle-
aged woman from Khuam village, responded 
to the Chinese taking away her farmland 
by opening a food stall in the market across 
from the casino in 2015, serving both Lao and 
southern Yunnan style noodles for employees 
and visitors. Within a short time Sai’s 
entrepreneurial effort was rewarded with a 
booming business and considerable revenue. 
Many Burmese migrant workers found 
social redemption in the Zone by reinventing 
themselves. Some turned to meta-
amphetamine smuggling from across the 
Mekong. This illegal activity allowed them to 
earn five to ten times as much as they would 
have in the more repressive and unequal 
context of Myanmar. A few young Burmese 
were able to save money not only to support 
their families back home, but also to pursue 
their studies at the university in Yangon. 
Some others became businesses owners. This 
was the case of Phon, a young man from the 
Shan States who had worked as a kitchen 
hand in a Chinese restaurant. In two years 
he had learned how to cook Chinese food and 
become fluent in the Chinese language. After 
his employer returned to China, Phon took on 
his former boss’s business with his sister, and 
opened a restaurant across from the casino. 
Marketing his cuisine as Chinese-Burmese 
fusion, within a short time Phon’s business 
had become quite profitable. Much like for 
the resilient Lao and other creative Burmese, 
for Phon the Chinese presence in the zone 
had paved the way for upward social mobility. 
Winds of Change?
This article has unravelled the political 
and labour contradictions born out of 
the partnership between Chinese capital 
and the Lao state in the GTSEZ. It has 
suggested that rather than being a site of 
neoliberal exception or crypto-colonial 
extraterritoriality, the GTSEZ is a frontier 
space of ad hoc experimental governance and 
liquid labour. Paradoxically, experimentation 
and liquidity have allowed many Lao and 
foreign residents to devise a new creative SEZ 
existence. A recent article in the Vientiane 
Times has denounced the lack of protection 
and precarious conditions for many Lao 
workers in sites where foreign companies 
operate. There is some hope that, under the 
rule of the allegedly progressive Lao Prime 
Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, elected in 2016, 
political rhetoric may be turned into an actual 
upholding of worker’s rights. This could be 
a good opportunity for the Lao state to use 
Chinese capital to construct a more equitable 
SEZ labourscape.
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In recent years, much has been written 
about how increasing labour costs in China—
among other factors—are pushing investors 
to move labour-intensive production to other 
countries where wages are still low. Due to its 
moderate capital requirements, low level of 
automation, and minimal demands in terms of 
skills, the garment industry is one of the sectors 
in which China’s loss of competitiveness 
is felt most acutely—especially as other 
countries, such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
Myanmar, and Cambodia, adopt policy after 
policy to entice foreign investors. But what 
does this shift in global capital trends entail 
for workers? How do the workforces in these 
new outsourcing destinations fare compared 
to their Chinese counterparts? There is no 
easy answer to these questions. Indeed, 
while the past two decades have seen a broad 
theoretical debate about the consequences 
and extent of the global ‘race to the bottom’ in 
labour standards, not much attention has yet 
been paid to the human costs of the wave of 
capital flight that is taking place in the wake 
of China’s industrial upgrade. To address 
this gap, in this essay I will compare garment 
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In recent years, much has been written about 
how increasing labour costs in China are pushing 
investors to move labour-intensive production 
to other countries where wages are still low. But 
what does this shift in global capital trends entail 
for workers? How do the workforces in these new 
outsourcing destinations fare compared to their 
Chinese counterparts? In order to gain a better 
understanding of the human cost of this latest 
capital flight, this essay compares garment 
workers in China and Cambodia, considering 
the wages they receive in relation to the context 
of their expectations and needs.
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Chinese and 
Cambodian Garment 
Workers Compared
Cambodian garment workers.
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workers in China and Cambodia, considering 
the wages they receive in the context of their 
expectations and needs. 
The choice of these two countries is 
dictated by the fact that the garment industry 
in China and Cambodia is at two different 
stages of development. While China remains 
the undisputed global leader in the industry, 
with its 2015 exports worth approximately 
274 billion USD, there are already signs that 
the Chinese garment sector is unravelling 
due to rising labour costs, as the country 
embarks on an ambitious path of industrial 
upgrading. The Cambodian garment industry, 
on the other hand, was only established in the 
mid-1990s, when Cambodia finally emerged 
from more than two decades of chaos, and 
maintains a positive outlook. Having started 
from barely 80 million USD of exports in 
1996, in 2015, the Cambodian garment sector 
had become a 6.8 billion USD industry, the 
ninth largest in the world. Of course, the 
weight of the two industries within their 
respective local economies is very different. 
While the garment industry today plays a 
relatively minor role in China—in 2015 only 12 
percent of the Chinese merchandise exports 
were in the garment sector—Cambodia’s 
economic growth remains heavily dependent 
on garment production, with about 610,000 
workers employed in the sector in 2016 and 
as much as 80 percent of the country’s total 
merchandise exports in the same year being 
garment and footwear products.
To explore these different contexts, during 
the summer of 2016 I undertook two surveys. 
The first was conducted in June and July 2016 
at three Hong Kong-owned garment factories 
in Dongguan, Guangdong province. These 
factories employed 2,000, 1,000, and 800 
workers respectively, and I was able to collect 
a total of 250 completed questionnaires. The 
second survey was carried out from July to 
September 2016 in three Hong Kong-owned 
garment factories in Phnom Penh, where 
most of the Cambodian garment industry 
is concentrated. In this case, the factories 
employed 5,700, 2,100, and 1,100 workers, 
and I collected a total of 291 questionnaires. 
To avoid interference from the management 
and possible biases in the responses of the 
workers, all respondents were approached 
outside the factory without prior knowledge of 
their employer. Most often, the meetings took 
place in the safety of their accommodation 
after their shift had ended or in restaurants 
around the factory during their lunch break. 
The quantitative data were supplemented 
with forty semi-structured interviews with 
garment workers employed in the sampled 
factories in both countries, plus additional 
interviews with local lawyers specialising in 
labour disputes, union leaders, and labour 
activists.
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Wage and Perceived Needs per Month in China (in USD)
The amount in RMB has been converted into USD at the exchange rate of 3 July 2016, 1 RMB = 0,15 USD
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Basic Guarantees
The two graphs that accompany this essay 
summarise my findings. The first aspect to 
consider when comparing the two countries 
is the level of wages guaranteed by law, i.e. 
the local minimum wage. This is depicted in 
the first column in both graphs. According 
to the Chinese labour legislation, local 
governments in China are allowed to decide 
their own minimum wage through a process of 
tripartite consultation between local labour 
departments, the official trade union, and 
business associations. In setting the amount, 
these actors have to consider several factors, 
including the cost of living, the percentage 
of social security contributions paid by the 
workers, the average salary in the area, the 
unemployment rate, and the local level of 
development. At the time of the survey, 
the minimum wage in Dongguan was set at 
1,510 RMB (roughly 229 USD) per month. In 
Cambodia, in 2016, authorities announced 
their intention to pass a Minimum Wage Law 
that would lay the foundations for a ‘universal 
minimum wage’ to be determined every year 
through ‘tripartite consultation’. However, 
currently only the garment and footwear 
sector is covered by a minimum wage, which is 
the same for the whole country. The amount is 
decided every year by the central government 
on the basis of the recommendation coming 
from a tripartite Labour Advisory Committee 
composed of 28 representatives. Of these, 
14 come from the government, 7 from the 
employers associations, and 7 from the unions 
(5 of which are considered pro-government). 
At the time of the survey, the Cambodian 
minimum wage was set at 140 USD per month. 
While in China there are no reported strikes 
related to minimum wage, in Cambodia the 
issue is at the centre of much controversy. 
In early January 2014, massive strikes 
and demonstrations of garment workers 
protesting over the government’s refusal to 
raise the minimum wage ended in a bloodbath 
after the intervention of the military police. 
Due to the increasing repression of civil 
society and independent unions by the 
Cambodian authorities (see also Norén-
Nilsson’s essay in this issue), the following 
years have seen no more mass demonstrations 
during the minimum wage negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the raises that were granted by 
the government have continually fallen short 
of the expectations of independent trade 
unions and workers—with the exception of 
2017, when the ruling party, concerned about 
its performance at the impending national 
Wage and Perceived Needs per Month in Cambodia (in USD)
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elections, actually granted a minimum 
wage rise in line with the demands of the 
unions, which will go into effect next year. 
In 2016, for instance, independent unions 
pushed for a new monthly minimum wage 
of no less than 171 USD, but the government 
settled on a figure of 153 USD, far closer 
to the 147 USD proposed by the garment 
employer association. This was far lower 
than the 177 USD that some local and global 
trade unions and advocacy groups had been 
demanding as a ‘living wage’ for Cambodian 
garment workers since 2014. In light of these 
controversies, it is unsurprising that the 
draft Minimum Wage Law mentioned above 
introduces severe restrictions on the ability 
of independent unions to negotiate for higher 
minimum wages. One example of this is the 
inclusion of clauses that allow for fines of 
up to 1,250 USD for those ‘creating obstacles 
or putting illegal pressure on discussions to 
determine the minimum wage’, or up to 2,500 
USD for anyone who ‘incites activities against 
the declaration of the minimum wage.’ 
Why do negotiations about the minimum 
wage elicit such different responses from 
Chinese and Cambodian workers? The reason 
can be found in the second column of both 
graphs, which depicts the basic wage, i.e. the 
monthly amount that the factories guarantee 
to the workers regardless of their actual 
workload. While the Cambodian factories 
offered a basic wage that coincided with the 
minimum wage, in China the basic wage was 
significantly higher (41.1 percent more) than 
the legal minimum. The explanation for this 
disparity can be found in the cyclical ‘labour 
famines’ (mingonghuang) that have hit 
coastal areas in China, including Guangdong 
province, since the early 2000s. With many 
young Chinese rural women deciding to 
stay home to raise a family or to look for a 
job in townships closer to their hometowns, 
companies in labour-intensive sectors such 
as the garment industry have no other choice 
than to offer salaries higher than the legal 
minimum in order to attract workers. This 
means that while increases in the minimum 
wage in Cambodia have a direct impact on 
the income of the workers, in China workers 
already receive higher basic salaries and 
therefore do not have a large stake in the 
government’s decisions on the matter. Most 
importantly, it shows that due to reasons 
related to demography, as much as to local 
development, Chinese workers have much 
more bargaining power than their Cambodian 
counterparts—a much more threatening 
prospect for investors than a difference of a 
few dozen dollars in the minimum wages.
Expectations and 
Perceived Needs
Minimum wages are simply a bottom line 
that is somehow supposed to protect workers 
from extreme exploitation, providing them 
with the guarantee of an income at times 
when production slows down due to the 
paucity of orders. As such, they do not reflect 
the actual level of remuneration that the 
workers receive, which in both China and 
Cambodia largely depends on the amount of 
overtime work. The Chinese workers in my 
sample worked an average of 10.3 hours a day 
from Monday to Friday, plus an average of 9.9 
hours on Saturdays, with only Sundays off. 
This is a clear violation of the national labour 
law, which states that workers should work no 
more than 8 hours a day and 44 hours a week, 
with a maximum of 36 hours of overtime a 
month. In Cambodia, the workers worked 9.7 
hours a day from Monday to Saturday and got 
only one day off every two weeks, another 
clear violation of the national legislation, 
which allows for 48 hours a week, with no 
more than 2 hours of overtime a day. 
Due to the large amount of overtime, 
workers in both countries were able to earn 
more than the local minimum wage. This 
can be seen clearly from the fourth column 
of both graphs, which depicts the take-
home wage, i.e. how much the workers were 
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actually paid after taxes and other deductions 
for social security. In absolute terms, Chinese 
garment workers received much higher take-
home wages compared to their Cambodian 
counterparts. While the Chinese workers in 
my sample were given an average take-home 
wage of 3,001.76 RMB (roughly 450.30 USD) 
a month, Cambodian workers were paid only 
243.53 USD, a gap which would most likely 
widen if the survey also included the costs 
born by the companies for social insurance 
and other welfare-related expenses, 
burdensome in China and almost non-existent 
in Cambodia. In this sense, the assumption 
that rising labour costs underscores industrial 
relocations from China to other countries 
indeed has a strong foundation.
Significantly, both workforces were not 
satisfied with their remuneration levels. The 
third column of both graphs shows the desired 
basic wage, i.e. the response to the question 
‘in a situation in which you have to work only 
40 hours a week [48 hours in Cambodia] and 
do not have to work overtime, how much 
do you think a reasonable salary would be?’ 
Comparing the desired basic wage with the 
actual basic wage highlights that workers 
in both countries thought it reasonable to 
receive much higher wages for working only 
ordinary hours, with the Chinese workers 
wanting 53.1 percent more and the Cambodian 
workers wanting 44.1 percent more. The same 
frustration emerged when the workers were 
asked about their desired take-home wage. 
The question, depicted in the fifth column 
of both graphs, was formulated as such: 
‘Considering your current workload, how 
much do you think would be a reasonable 
salary for you?’ While Chinese workers 
considered 4,374.80 RMB (roughly 656.20 
USD) to be a reasonable amount, 34.1 per cent 
more than their take-home wage, Cambodian 
workers desired 304.53 USD, that is ‘only’ 25 
per cent more than what they were currently 
making. 
Still, the roots of this dissatisfaction 
cannot be understood without considering 
the perceived economic needs of the two 
workforces, which are displayed in the 
sixth column of the graphs. As mentioned 
above, international advocacy groups and 
Cambodian independent unions have been 
campaigning since 2014 for a living wage of 
177 USD per month. An unpublished survey 
undertaken by several unions and NGOs in 
Cambodia in June 2016 found that workers in 
Phnom Penh needed around 142 USD a month 
for their living expenditures. Yet, as Dennis 
Arnold has noted, ‘workers’ politics and 
livelihood concerns [in Cambodia] include 
and extend beyond the (peri-) urban factory 
floor to rural households.’ For this reason, in 
my survey I decided to go beyond basic living 
expenses and ask: ‘On average, how much do 
you think you need every month to cover the 
basic living expenses of yourself and your 
immediate family (your partner, children, 
parents, or other people whom you have to 
support)?’ 
The responses were surprising, considering 
that living costs are much higher in Dongguan 
than in Phnom Penh. Cambodian workers felt 
they needed an average of 345 USD per month, 
more than the 1,958.80 RMB (roughly 293.80 
USD) required by the Chinese workers. One 
initial explanation for this counterintuitive 
finding is that most Cambodian workers came 
from extended families—besides their parents, 
84.2 per cent of them had three siblings or 
more—with most family members remaining 
in the countryside to engage in agricultural 
work. A second reason is that while 82.4 per 
cent of the Chinese workers in my sample 
lived in a dormitory provided by the factory—
evidence of the persistence of the so-called 
‘dormitory labour regime’ in today’s China—
and thus paid only a symbolic fee for water, 
gas, and electricity averaging 122 RMB 
(roughly 18.30 USD) a month, Cambodian 
workers had to find private accommodation 
outside the factory, paying an average of 
34.40 USD monthly. Chinese workers also had 
access to much cheaper food, paying 311.57 
RMB (approximately 46.70 USD) for their 
40 MADE IN CHINA - FOCUS
Ivan Franceschini
Ivan Franceschini is a Marie Curie 
Fellow at Ca’ Foscari University 
of Venice and at the Australian 
Centre on China in the World. He 
is working on a project on Chinese 
labour in a global perspective.
meals on average, compared to the 71.66 USD 
paid by Cambodian workers. This disparity in 
expenses clearly affected the amount of funds 
sent home. While Chinese workers were able 
to remit 1,724.90 RMB (roughly 258.70 USD) 
a month, i.e. 57.5 per cent of their take-home 
wage, Cambodian workers could only send 
67.55 USD, i.e. 22.2 per cent of their take-
home wage.
 
A Matter of Survival
What does this comparison tell us about the 
implications of the decline of the garment 
industry in China? First, it says that labour 
costs—as shown by the data on minimum 
wages and take-home wages— are indeed 
much higher in China than in Cambodia. 
This situation is further compounded if we 
consider the likely impact of the various costs 
related to social security and welfare that 
the companies must bear—costs which are 
substantial in China and almost non-existent 
in Cambodia. Even more important, in order 
to face the challenges posed by demographic 
trends and local development, garment 
factories in China today often have no 
other choice than to offer better conditions 
than the legal minimum wage in order to 
attract workers. This is in stark contrast to 
Cambodia, where most employers have no 
incentive whatsoever to provide anything 
more than to what they are legally bound. In 
such a context, although China still offers 
advantages in terms of infrastructure and 
the availability of raw materials, investments 
in labour-intensive industry are likely to 
continue to desert the country. 
Second, my survey demonstrates that by 
relocating from China to Cambodia, investors 
perpetuate dynamics of exploitation. This 
emerges clearly from the data regarding 
the expectations and perceived needs of 
the workers in the two countries. While the 
Chinese workers in my sample were finally 
able to earn wages higher than what they felt 
they needed, their Cambodian counterparts 
still earned much less than their perceived 
needs. It was definitely not a coincidence 
that wages were never at the top of the list of 
the workers’ concerns during my interviews 
in China, while they regularly came up in 
my conversations in Cambodia. This does 
not mean that Chinese garment workers 
are happy with their remuneration—on 
the contrary, as we have seen, they still 
deem wages ‘unreasonable’ in light of their 
workload. Still, there is a fundamental 
difference between dissatisfaction due to 
the perceived unfairness of the economic 
treatment experienced in the workplace, 
as I found in China, and a deeper concern 
about the ability to provide a basic level of 
subsistence for oneself and one’s family, as 
I encountered in Cambodia. It is this kind 
of human cost that employers should bear 
in mind when deciding to relocate from one 
country to the next in their unending quest 
for lower costs and higher profits.
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This essay compares the prospects for union 
reform in Vietnam and China. In Vietnam, 
heated debates about how to reform the trade 
union and the industrial relations system 
have been ongoing for more than a year, 
ever since the government signed the now 
defunct Transnational Pacific Partnership 
Agreement. That the debate continues among 
the top leadership and within government 
bureaucracies indicates that there is no lack of 
willingness to reform. In China, on the contrary, 
the Chinese party-state and the official unions 
are taking the route of suppression of labour 
activism, indicating grim prospects for union 
reform.
Trade Union Reform 
in One-Party States: 
China and Vietnam 
Compared
These two comments embody the current 
concerns over the problems that the Vietnam 
General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) and 
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) are facing in their respective 
countries. In Vietnam, heated debates 
about how to reform the trade union and 
the industrial relations system have been 
going on for more than a year, ever since 
the government signed the now defunct 
Transnational Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP) with the United States in February 
2016. Vietnam’s eagerness to become a 
member of the TPP was due to the promising 
prospect of quick economic gains connected 
to the membership. In light of this, there was 
consensus in the government and the VGCL on 
the need to enter into this international pact 
despite the TPP’s Chapter 19, which required 
Vietnam to ensure freedom of association. 
If the TTP had been implemented, workers 
would have been permitted to set up their 
own unions and affiliate themselves to union 
federations of their choice. This would have 
meant a fundamental change in Vietnam’s 
political structure necessitating relevant laws 
to be revised and new institutions created. In 
As I understand it, the new President of the 
Vietnam General Confederation of Labour is 
enthusiastic about continuing efforts to ‘renovate’ 
grassroots unions even if the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement does not go forward… In 
addition, I understand that the Ministry of Labour 
has moved forward with creating a new division 
of industrial relations that will administer the 
registration of independent unions.
An ILO Consultant
2 March 2017
From the [Chinese] trade union’s 
standpoint we do not welcome labour 
NGOs. We even feel antagonistic towards 
them. My own feeling is about the same. 
The union has always taken them as a 
serious enemy. 
An informal employee of the Chinese trade union
    4 January 2017
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Silk Factory, Central Highlands of Vietnam.
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order to support this complicated process, 
the United States government had already 
earmarked four million dollars to fund the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
and the Vietnamese Ministry of Labour, 
Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in 
the development of a plan for the reform of 
industrial relations in the country within 
five years. 
Sceptics, die-hard critics of one-party 
states, and those who would have been losers 
in the new deal—such as the American 
trade unions—believe that Vietnam signed 
the TPP for purely economic reasons, and 
that genuine freedom of association for 
Vietnamese workers is unlikely to materialise. 
When Donald Trump withdrew from the TPP 
in February 2017, scepticism heightened. 
Indeed it seems that the factions within the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the 
VGCL that have not been so supportive of 
dismantling the monopolistic trade union 
system are now backtracking. At the time of 
writing, freedom of association is still under 
discussion in Vietnam, albeit not as urgently 
as before. Still, as the quote from the ILO 
Consultant indicates, the issue is not yet 
dead and drawing up a programme for trade 
union reform is now seen as the more urgent 
task. Had Vietnam been motivated only by 
economic interests, then these initiatives 
would have been dropped entirely. That the 
debate continues among the top leadership 
and within government bureaucracies 
indicates that the willingness to reform is 
also self-motivated. This essay points to the 
fact that signing the TPP was not a decision 
solely made on the spur of the moment with 
economic gains in mind, but also has deeper 
historical roots.
To strengthen my argument, I will compare 
Vietnam with China. As many other scholars 
(including myself) have already discovered, 
China is an excellent comparator for Vietnam. 
Both countries are Asian, socialist, one-party 
states steeped in market socialism, and they are 
both often criticised as being authoritarian. 
The countries’ ossified political structures 
share many common characteristics borne 
from their Marxist-Leninist origins, but in 
as much there are varieties of capitalism, 
there are also varieties of socialism. Having 
recognised their similarities, identifying 
their differences and tracing the root causes 
of their divergences allows us to understand 
both systems better.
The second quote at the beginning of this 
essay is taken from an interview with a young 
university graduate hired by a city-level trade 
union in Guangdong province. Only one year 
earlier, for the first time the local government 
had launched a massive crackdown that 
saw the arrest and interrogation of some 
twenty labour NGO activists. The quote—as 
well as those arrests—shows that, while the 
Vietnamese are debating how to liberalise 
the trade union system, the Chinese party-
state and the ACFTU are taking the route 
of suppression. Thus, the prospects for 
trade union reform in the two countries are 
very different. But before analysing these 
prospects, we need to examine the historical 
roots of why these two one-party states are 
not equally authoritarian. 
Historical, Political, and 
Structural Differences 
While both the Vietnamese and Chinese 
unions have been conceived of as Leninist 
‘transmission belts’ between the higher 
echelons of the party-state and the masses, 
with an additional role as dispensers of social 
welfare, in many respects the ACFTU is much 
weaker than the VGCL. The ACFTU has been 
in a subservient status under party-state 
domination since 1949, bereft of any élan of 
resistance. For eleven years, from 1967 to 1978, 
it was even disbanded. After Deng Xiaoping 
came back to power in 1978, he re-established 
the ACFTU and gave it some magnitude of 
autonomy, but to this day it remains no more 
than a very weak bureaucracy. The VGCL, on 
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the other hand, has a history of militancy, 
first against French colonialism and then 
against American invasion. As Gabriel Kolko 
has written, ‘All wars more or less transcend 
the control of those leading them…’ Because 
of the war, the union had stronger ties with 
its constituency. In the South, trade unions 
battled against American and Vietnamese 
capitalism. After the war ended in 1975, a 
legacy of militancy remained, so much so that 
when I interviewed quite a high-level trade 
unionist in the mid-1990s, I had the feeling I 
was talking to a trade union official who still 
possessed some revolutionary commitment, 
unlike those Chinese union officials who 
tended to just spout the Party line. South 
Vietnam had never been totally absorbed 
into the fold of the socialist bureaucratic 
subservient structure when doi moi—that 
is ‘renovation’, an expression equivalent 
to China’s ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige 
kaifang)—began in the mid-1980s. 
Both the ACFTU and VGCL tried to wrest 
more power from their respective party-states 
in the late 1980s. While the ACFTU failed to 
gain anything following the suppression of 
the Tiananmen Uprising in 1989, the VGCL, 
in contrast, achieved some independence 
a year earlier at its 1988 Congress. The 
then secretary general of the CPV declared 
that union cadres might voice their ideas 
independently of the Party and management. 
Thus, when I first began doing research on 
Vietnam I was surprised to discover that Lao 
Dong (Labour), the official newspaper of the 
VGCL, carried articles in which the union 
openly staked positions that were different 
from those of the Party and of MOLISA. One 
consistent public debate up to this very day has 
been the VGCL’s argument that the minimum 
wage is set too low for workers’ needs. Never 
has such kind of public discussion appeared 
in the Chinese Workers’ Daily, the ACFTU’s 
mouthpiece, where all Chinese bureaucracies 
speak with one voice—that of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). If there were any 
internal debates on these issues in China, 
they took place behind closed doors. This 
difference in the trade union publications 
alone indicated that in Vietnam there was 
some room for transparency, and that the 
VGCL had some space to act independently. 
One reason why the VGCL could enjoy this 
space is partly related to the trade union’s 
organisational structure. The Chinese and 
Vietnamese administrative systems are 
similar. In both countries, the Party has 
control over the appointment of leading 
union cadres at each level. Leading cadres 
are also subjected to two management 
systems, what the Chinese authorities call 
‘branch dictates’ (tiaotiao zhuanzheng) and 
‘area dictates’ (kuaikuai zhuanzheng), with 
‘branch’ referring to ministerial hierarchical 
chain of commands, and ‘area’ referring to a 
command system under the Party at the same 
hierarchal level. However, while the Chinese 
bureaucracy is dominated by ‘area dictates’, 
Vietnam is more inclined towards ‘branch 
dictates’. In other words, the VGCL’s line of 
command from the top to various lower level 
unions can override the interests of the Party 
at the same levels. This permits the VGCL to 
carry out its assigned mission to represent 
and protect workers’ rights without being 
trumped by the priorities of the local party-
state for economic development. In China, in 
contrast, local unions are under the control 
of the local party-state and thus tend to 
collude with employers, a situation that 
makes it difficult for them to help workers 
even if they are so inclined. The difference 
is further amplified by Vietnam’s traditional 
sectoral trade unions that have a vertical 
line of command. In China, sectoral industrial 
unions do exist but they are so weak that they 
are almost irrelevant.
Different Attitudes and 
Ways of Handling Strikes
Since the mid-2000s, both countries have 
been plagued by wild-cat strikes, especially 
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in the labour-intensive export sector. None of 
these strikes is organised by official grassroots 
trade unions, and they are thus ‘leaderless’ 
strikes. China has chosen to be silent on the 
legal status of strikes and, without functioning 
formal channels to resolve their grievances, 
going on strike has become the only possible 
strategy for workers to call attention to their 
plight. Vietnam, in contrast, recognises the 
right to strike on condition that workers 
follow a cumbersome application procedure. 
However, the process is so laborious that out 
of the several thousands of strikes that broke 
out in the past two decades not even one can 
be considered legal. This situation may lead 
one to conclude that the concession of a legal 
right to strike is irrelevant in preventing 
strikes from breaking out. 
The difference, therefore, is not in the law 
but in the authorities’ attitude to strikes. Since 
strikes in Vietnam are officially recognised 
as a right of the workers—even if they do not 
comply with the pre-strike procedures—when 
a strike breaks out, the local Department of 
Labour and the local trade union immediately 
arrive on the scene, lambast the management 
for violating the laws, and negotiate on 
behalf of the workers. The police too rush to 
the scene, but they just stand by in case the 
strikes descend into violence. Once workers’ 
demands are met—usually this happens in a 
couple of days—production returns to normal. 
As for China, since the party-state does not 
recognise strikes as a right of the workers, the 
local authorities’ attitude towards strikes is 
generally hostile. They are seen as potentially 
socially and politically destabilising, and thus 
anathema to capital investment and economic 
development. The local union arrives on the 
strike scene to quell the disturbance rather 
than to act as a representative of the workers. 
The police is apt to use force, especially 
if workers take to the streets. In such a 
context, Chinese workers see the union, local 
government, and management as colluding 
against them. In fact, the attitude of Chinese 
workers towards the union is not only one 
of mistrust, but antagonism. Vietnamese 
workers on the other hand see the primary 
union as representative of their rights 
despite its weakness. Here are the surprising 
results of a survey that Wang Hongzen and I 
undertook in 2007. 
Vietnamese and Chinese Workers’ Attitudes towards Factory Trade Unions
Do you think the trade union in your workplace represents workers’ interests?
Vietnam China
Yes 894 (85%) 100 (10%)
No 58 (6%) 203 (20%)
Don’t know 100 (9%) 672 (67%)
Missing 2 (<1%) 33 (3%)
Total 1054 (100%) 1008 (100%)
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In other words, though their union is weak, 
the vast majority of Vietnamese workers still 
tend to think of the union as an ally rather 
than an antagonist. 
Different Countries, 
Different Systems
To summarise, though their workplace union 
is weak, the two countries are quite different 
historically, politically, and culturally. On 
the whole Vietnam is more pluralistic while 
China is more monolithic. These fundamental 
preconditions lead to a divergence in 
the formation of the system of industrial 
relations. The situation in Vietnam is much 
more conducive to learning from and working 
with foreign countries and organisations. For 
many years, the MOLISA and VGCL have 
been working closely with international 
organisations, the most important of them 
being the ILO, which played an important 
role in helping and advising Vietnam to revise 
the strike regulations included in the 2012 
Labour Code. They have also been partnering 
with two trade union support and solidarity 
organisations: the German Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES) and the Australian Union Aid 
Abroad (APHEDA). The Australian Public 
Sector Union also helped the VGCL when it 
was setting up its public sector union in the 
early 1990s.
Vietnamese trade unionists, unlike their 
Chinese counterparts, are used to addressing 
foreign trade unionists and labour activists 
as brothers and sisters. It reflects their self-
identity as comrades in the international 
trade union community. The TPP, therefore, 
should not be seen as the root cause, but as 
a trigger of Vietnam’s decision to reform 
its industrial relations system, including 
setting up a system that recognises freedom 
of association. In fact, it was the VGCL that 
proposed to the party-state to accept this 
demand of the American government. The 
VGCL felt confident enough in its own ability 
to compete for the loyalty of Vietnamese 
workers with emerging new trade unions. 
In mid-2016 during our field research, we 
saw the relevant Vietnamese bureaucracy 
stakeholders, in collaboration with the ILO, 
rolling out programmes of social dialogue and 
collective bargaining at various administrative 
levels. There was open discussion that some 
workers had already agitated to set up new 
independent unions and the urge was not to 
suppress them, but to revise the relevant laws 
to make them reflect this new reality. At the 
behest of the ILO, Vietnam is consolidating 
a peak tripartite system. Minimum wage and 
other labour standards are now set at the 
national level after intense debate between 
the three parties—government, employers, 
and unions. The emphasis of the programme 
is on strengthening the trade unions’ power 
and their ability to negotiate at different 
levels. Training on social dialogue techniques 
is aimed at instructing union officials to 
identify themselves as representatives of 
the workers and dissociate themselves from 
management domination. The ILO’s tripartite 
system is beginning to take shape in Vietnam. 
However, it seems that the VGCL is on the 
losing end. After the new minimum wages 
for various regions were announced in June 
2017, the VGCL openly complained that they 
were too low to meet workers’ needs. 
In the past two years, the ACFTU has also 
been in the midst of reforms. Programmes 
to reform the union in China are not 
unprecedented, but time and again not 
much has changed. Direct elections of 
workplace union committees, campaigns to 
establish workplace collective bargaining, 
and the setting up of amalgamated unions 
at the district or village level for scattered 
small workplaces have all failed to effect 
any noticeable changes, except in isolated 
cases. With strikes breaking out unabated, 
particularly in Guangdong province, the 
ACFTU has been blamed for its incompetence 
in keeping the labour peace. 
Meanwhile under Xi Jinping the Chinese 
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authorities have intensified their repression 
of labour activism; labour NGOs have been 
harassed and some of their staff have been 
arrested. Foreign contacts are controlled and 
closely monitored. According to authoritative 
internal sources, Xi has lambasted the ACFTU, 
blaming it for having alienated itself from the 
workers. The unions are criticised for four 
types of ‘ossification’—they are said to have 
become bureaucratised, hedonistic, behaving 
like royalty, and acting like functionaries. A 
new round of reform has been ordered—union 
officials are to be at one with the people, with 
more grassroots and amalgamated unions 
to be set up to provide workers with more 
services. At the same time, the role of the CCP 
at the grassroots is also being strengthened, 
with the Party being cast as the overseer of 
the union reform. 
In January 2017, we had a chance to observe 
how this programme is being carried out in 
an industrial zone in Guangdong province. 
The city union has used its own resources 
to recruit a dozen or so young university or 
college graduates to staff one of the zone’s 
community centres. From here they provide 
social services, run social club activities, and 
disseminate some labour law knowledge to the 
workers in the neighbourhood. The office is 
open until late at night, unlike a regular trade 
union office that only opens during normal 
work hours. It is hoped that workers who 
are active in organising social activities will 
ultimately become labour activists. If a strike 
involving more than one hundred workers 
breaks out in the neighbourhood, it is not the 
task of the office staff to intervene. They have 
to wait for the local union and authorities to 
come to resolve the problem by themselves. 
The reason why this type of work cannot be 
taken care of by a regular grassroots trade 
union office, we were told, is because the 
union is held back by its own organisational 
inertia. For all intents and purposes, these 
grassroots union outposts resemble youth 
centres and community centres. It is through 
these services that the city union hopes to be 
able to satisfy the assigned responsibility of 
being at one with the masses. But it is not the 
regular trade union staff who is tasked to do 
this—it is their surrogates. At best, one can 
characterise this programme as social work 
trade unionism. 
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Under the presidency of Xi Jinping and Donald 
Trump, relations between trade unions in the 
United States and China have come to a virtual 
standstill. To understand how we arrived at 
this point, and what can be done to break the 
impasse, this essay briefly reviews the historical 
development of union relations between the two 
countries. In order to achieve this, it draws on 
voices of those labour leaders in the United 
States who have been direct participants in 
efforts to develop early contacts with their 
Chinese counterparts.
Prospects for 
US-China Union 
Relations in the Era 
of Xi and Trump
In October 2013, Richard Trumka, President 
of the American Federation of Labour and 
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-
CIO), visited the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) to establish formal 
bilateral relations between unions in China 
and the United States. This visit signalled an 
historic shift in labour policy, from Cold War-
style hostility to normalisation of relations. 
Some American labour activists hoped that it 
might further lead to collaboration on joint 
activities, such as collective bargaining. That 
collaboration would be a significant step 
forward in labour solidarity and building a 
global labour movement.
However since then progress towards 
building relations has been decidedly slow. 
There have been only a couple of official 
exchanges with the AFL-CIO, and activities 
sponsored by Change To Win (CTW), the 
splinter group of the AFL-CIO that first began 
relations with the ACFTU a decade ago, have 
decreased. Some American labour leaders 
have noted that the ACFTU has become less 
interested in collective bargaining since Xi 
Jinping’s campaign against corruption began. 
Now, given Donald Trump’s election as US 
President with his agenda to weaken the 
Xi Jinping and Donald Trump during one of their first official meetings.
Photo: Businessinsider.com
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American labour movement and start a trade 
war with China, it is fair to ask whether there 
are any prospects for progress in relations 
between unions in China and the US, and if 
so where.
To understand the American perspective on 
the relationship between the US and Chinese 
unions, I will briefly review the historical 
development of relations between workers in 
the two countries. Then, I will address more 
recent union relations based on information 
obtained through semi-structured interviews 
with a dozen labour leaders in the US who 
have been direct participants in efforts to 
develop those relations. Finally, I will discuss 
the challenges and opportunities laid out by 
my informants and draw conclusions. 
A Troubled History
The root of American attitudes towards 
Chinese labour have been shaped by race, 
class, and ideology. Since the nineteenth 
century there have been xenophobic fears 
of the ‘Yellow Peril’ represented by Chinese 
workers, as well as arguments that workers 
of European ancestry should cast their lot 
with American business and shut out Chinese 
workers. These fears were compounded 
in 1949, when China became a communist 
state and an ideological enemy, resulting in 
antipathies that linger to this day. 
After World War II, the Cold War set in, 
and the world was divided into two main 
ideological camps: the communist and the 
‘free world’. In 1949, American unions led 
a split in the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU)—a global union that aspired 
to bring together unions from all over the 
world into a single organisation—to form 
the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), an alliance of free 
world unions. Meanwhile, the WFTU came 
to be known as the federation of communist 
unions, to which the ACFTU was affiliated. 
Back then, divisions in the international 
working class mirrored ideological debates 
among nation-states. The ICFTU consistently 
criticised the ACFTU for not being a free 
and independent trade union, and therefore 
declared that it was not an ‘authentic’ voice 
of Chinese workers. 
However, in 1979, when China opened its 
doors to foreign investment and diplomatic 
relations with the US were established, 
the material basis for this divide changed. 
Multinational corporations raced to China to 
take advantage of the low-cost labour. Factory 
conditions were appalling and workers were 
exploited, causing outcry among international 
consumer and human rights activists, and 
drawing criticism of the Chinese government 
and its unions for not protecting workers. At 
a time when international labour solidarity 
might have meant American workers reaching 
out to workers in China, American unions 
continued to refuse to have anything to do 
with Chinese unions, repeating the Cold War 
rhetoric that they were neither independent 
nor authentic. Meanwhile, some left-leaning 
labour organisers worked quietly in the 
background to coordinate worker-to-worker 
exchanges between US and Chinese workers, 
hoping to build solidarity. 
The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 proved 
to be a setback for these budding relations. 
The crackdown on the protests was viewed 
worldwide on cable news in real time, and 
its brutality reinforced what many American 
labour unionists had believed all along—
that despite capitalist markets and openness 
to meeting foreigners, China was still an 
authoritarian state that did not respect human 
rights. The AFL-CIO response was to support 
a few Chinese labour activists in exile, and to 
continue to boycott relations with Chinese 
unions.
At that time, American unions supported 
campaigns targeting international brands, 
pressuring these companies to accept 
corporate social responsibility in their supply 
chains. The theory was that the brands 
had power to control labour conditions in 
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factories that manufactured their products. 
In Latin America, Africa, and Southeast 
Asia, these cross-border campaigns, mostly 
led not by unions but by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), had modest success 
in supporting worker organising. However, 
with respect to China—where an increasing 
share of the world’s export manufacturing 
was taking place, and where supply chain 
organising strategies might have had an 
impact on the global economy—no NGO ever 
figured out how to get brands to pressure 
the Chinese government to allow workers to 
organise themselves.
Another response of American unions was 
to push for trade sanctions against China. 
Arguing that the low labour standards in 
China undercut American jobs, the AFL-
CIO sought to block China from entering 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
from receiving Most Favoured Nations status 
under Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
(PNTR) with the US. Using the race card 
once again, the AFL-CIO’s petition against 
PNTR painted a dehumanised picture of 
Chinese workers as willing slaves who were 
willing to work for practically nothing, thus 
undermining the standards of American 
workers. It argued that sanctions would 
force the Chinese government to improve 
conditions for Chinese workers. So at the turn 
of the twenty-first century, racist stereotypes 
of Chinese workers that were common over 
a century before were still being used, and 
policies from the Cold War era that ended 
nearly half a century before still kept Chinese 
and US workers divided.
  
First Engagements
Meanwhile, global labour activists 
continued to organise worker-to-worker 
exchanges. In 2002, Andy Stern, president of 
the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU), participated in an exchange that 
was facilitated by Kent Wong for the Asian 
Pacific American Labour Alliance (APALA), 
a constituency group of the AFL-CIO that 
was formed in part to break through racial 
stereotypes of Asian workers. Stern was later 
criticised by AFL-CIO leaders for having 
visited China, but he was firmly convinced 
that China was important to the global 
economy, and he was determined to develop 
relationships with the ACFTU. Importantly, 
he was an activist union leader, so he was 
looking not just to have fraternal affiliations, 
but also to find ways to collaborate on 
joint action. One of the issues that SEIU 
continuously raised with the ACFTU was 
its concern about Walmart. In 2005, SEIU 
was heavily involved in the American labour 
campaign against Walmart, and Stern hoped 
that there was a way for US and Chinese 
unions to collaborate. 
In 2005, when SEIU and other unions 
broke away from the AFL-CIO to form the 
CTW federation, Andy Stern persuaded other 
CTW leaders to go to China to see things for 
themselves and to propose joint action. One 
of these leaders was James Hoffa, president of 
the Teamsters union, and an active opponent 
of PNTR for China. Staffed by veteran 
international labour activist Tim Beaty, 
Hoffa’s approach to relations with Chinese 
unions was open but cautious. As Beaty told 
me in an interview in February 2017: 
I did have an idea that by going to China, 
talking directly to folks, even in formal 
contexts, about leadership elections, how we 
collectively bargain, that maybe there would 
be an opportunity to see an alternative way. 
We might get discussion, contribute to the 
process of change inside the ACFTU, and 
create a different consciousness, broaden 
alternatives and possible reforms. Maybe 
this would legitimise people who had more 
democratic idea of getting workers involved. 
I have no idea that that has happened. Maybe 
I was naïve. 
Another CTW leader who travelled 
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to China, United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) President Joe Hansen, was 
interested in the connections that Chinese 
unions had with the same employers. Early 
on he was concerned about the impact of 
Chinese companies selling pork to the US, and 
later in 2013, he became concerned when the 
Chinese company Shuanghui International 
purchased Smithfield Food, an American 
meat processor where the union had won 
an organising campaign after a long and 
bitter battle. Shuanghui, now known as WH 
Group, recognised the union, added 38,000 
workers to the payroll, and has continued the 
collective bargaining relationship. 
In other words, from the early 2000s, CTW 
unions stepped into uncharted territories to 
try to get to know the ACFTU and find out 
what kind of relationship and joint action 
was possible. The Teamsters hoped that 
engagement would lead to labour solidarity 
as they practice it with other countries, but 
repeatedly found that the ACFTU side was not 
interested in providing information or writing 
letters of solidarity. UFCW also hoped that 
there could be joint work with the ACFTU on 
mutual employers, but found little interest 
at the regional level, though a proposal for 
a research survey sent ripples that were felt 
worldwide. SEIU built deep relationships 
that made important headway in the Walmart 
campaign, but found that unionising China’s 
Walmart workers did not actually provide 
workers with a voice. These unions found 
that their concepts of solidarity might be very 
different from those of the ACFTU, and that 
their goals for developing relationships and 
activities might not be exactly the same.
AFL-CIO and China
In 2011, the ACFTU made a bid for a seat on 
the governing body of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), which placed the AFL-
CIO in the middle of an international debate. 
Many American and international unions 
opposed the bid on the grounds of the old 
ICFTU arguments that it was not independent 
and not authentically representatives of 
Chinese workers. On the other hand, other 
labour movements supported the bid, on the 
grounds that the ACFTU is the official union 
of China and it represents the largest working 
class in the world. In this path-breaking 
vote, the AFL-CIO abstained, paving the 
way for the ascendance of ACFTU to the ILO 
governing body.
The AFL-CIO decision was advanced by 
its International Affairs Director, Cathy 
Feingold, who in an interview I had with her 
in January 2017 rationalised: ‘We thought 
constructive engagement was important, but 
we could not fully endorse, because of human 
rights and other issues.’ In the end, the 
decision paved the way for Feingold to begin a 
process of building relationships with ACFTU 
leaders at the ILO, and making plans for AFL-
CIO President Richard Trumka to visit China. 
Her efforts bore fruit in September 2013, 
when Trumka and a small group of AFL-CIO 
staff made the first official AFL-CIO visit to 
China. Though this visit was relatively low-
key, it was nevertheless historic, given the 
hostile relations that had existed between US 
and Chinese workers in the previous decades. 
In spite of the goodwill expressed 
during Trumka’s visit, progress in building 
relationships between Chinese and American 
unions has been slow, for both AFL-CIO 
and CTW unions. Both federations say that 
exchanges are cordial, though veteran China 
labour hands like Josie Mooney and Kent Wong 
in interviews I had with them in January and 
February 2017 say that frank conversations 
are more difficult since there have been many 
changes in union leadership in both countries, 
and trust relationships have to be rebuilt. 
According to my interviewees, in recent years 
there have been some tensions, like with 
the Chinese government’s 2014 criticism of 
the AFL-CIO’s decades-long support for the 
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, 
through its international education arm, the 
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American Center for International Labour 
Solidarity. The ACFTU has also voiced 
displeasure with the City University of New 
York’s grant from the US State Department to 
do labour education in China.
One new development involves union 
relations at Chinese firms investing in the 
US. In 2016, Chinese companies invested 
nearly 54 billion USD in the US in various 
industries, which was up 359 percent from 
the previous year. There is no systematic data 
on how these investments are affecting labour 
relations, but there are at least some cases, 
like the Smithfield Foods case mentioned 
earlier, which appear to indicate that Chinese 
employers are not necessarily anti-union. 
In such a context, once again attempts have 
been made to build relationships between 
Chinese and American unions vis-a-vis a 
common employer. Instead of building the 
relationships by building union-to-union ties, 
this strategy relies on the employer as the 
bridge between the unions, at least initially. 
The Larger Picture
Relations between unions in the US and 
China are one aspect of the larger picture of 
global capital and global labour. Presumably, 
if the labour movements in the US and China 
were strong, and relations between the two 
countries were strong, they could muster a 
countervailing force against multinational 
capital. Towards this end, some American 
unions have attempted to establish relations 
with unions in China to work on joint 
campaigns against common employers. While 
in the process they have broken through 
some stereotypes and misconceptions about 
China and Chinese workers, in general they 
have found the ACFTU to be welcoming and 
cordial, but perhaps not so interested in 
joint campaigns against common employers 
aimed at worker empowerment. In spite of 
this, American unions remain committed 
to searching for ways to work with Chinese 
unions. 
Under the current presidencies of Xi 
Jinping and Donald Trump, it is possible 
that these fledgling attempts at building 
relationships will be further set back. Under 
Xi, the Chinese government has cracked 
down on human rights and labour activists, 
and has put NGOs under the administration 
of the Public Security Bureau, its domestic 
security agency. This may make the ACFTU 
less interested in sharing information with 
American unions about activating workers, 
particularly with regard to coordinating 
collective bargaining and strategic campaigns. 
Meanwhile, Trump’s current agenda includes 
a myriad of threats to lower labour standards, 
eliminate collective bargaining rights, 
and substantially weaken union influence. 
American unions are currently preparing for 
major defensive battles, and have already 
announced substantial staff layoffs and 
financial cutbacks. Given these challenges to 
their survival, they may have little resources 
left for international solidarity.
One area that might have complex 
consequences is international trade. Donald 
Trump has already announced that the US will 
withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), decrease its role in the World Trade 
Organisation, and hold China accountable for 
currency manipulation. He has even hired 
Peter Navarro—producer of the fervently 
anti-China film Death by China— as his 
chief trade adviser and many observers are 
concerned that they intend to start a trade 
war with China. Some US unions, like the 
autoworkers and steelworkers, are cheering 
Trump’s positions on trade (even as they face 
decimation from Trump’s domestic labour 
policies), because they believe that trade 
barriers will bring back jobs to American 
workers. It is hard to say at this point if trade 
barriers will cause American firms to reinvest 
in the US, without knowing what the specific 
policies and comparative costs will be. In 
any case, it will be important to watch out 
for racial stereotyping that has been used to 
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advance support for protectionist trade in the 
past.
Meanwhile, Xi Jinping has stepped into 
the vacuum left by Trump’s retreat from 
global trade, and is proposing that China 
lead the world’s new economic order. Among 
many concerns, this raises the question as 
to whether China would consent to a labour 
clause as a core chapter in these international 
trade agreements, something that global 
labour activists have spent many years 
fighting for, and have actually achieved in 
cases like the TPP. These labour clauses have 
varied in effectiveness, but in some cases 
they have provided the basis for workers to 
advance rights, like freedom of association in 
Vietnam. Given China’s poor record on labour 
standards enforcement domestically, it would 
be a surprise if it agreed to a labour clause 
in international trade agreements. Of course, 
the ACFTU would be bound to support Xi’s 
position because it is subordinate to the 
Chinese Communist Party, but this position 
would also be consistent with views that 
were expressed to American trade unionists 
on numerous exchange visits.
In an era when relations between unions 
in the US and China do not progress or even 
regress, what is to be done? According to 
veteran labour activist Apo Leong, whom 
I interviewed in January 2017, ‘Over the 
years we’ve seen political windows open and 
close, and during the closed periods labour 
organisers need to continue foundational 
work that will put them in a better position 
to advance when the political window opens.’ 
For American and Chinese unions, this might 
mean that both sides should continue to have 
official exchanges, while understanding that 
the pace of engagement may not accelerate. It 
also suggests the need to evaluate where some 
gains can be made, perhaps in areas of mutual 
interest other than strategic campaigns, like 
health and safety or labour law. Aside from 
high level official exchanges, US and Chinese 
unions might also consider increasing lower 
level dialogues among union members and 
staff aimed at strengthening friendship—
such as member-to-member visits, staff 
internship exchanges, and technical and 
research exchange. After all, US-China union 
relationships will continue to be critical to 
labour power in the global economy, but given 
the current political climate, organisers need 
to be more strategic than before and ensure 
that the one step forward is not undone by 
two steps backwards.
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The Future of 
Contemporary China 
Studies
The study of contemporary China is currently facing 
formidable challenges. On one hand, there is the long-
standing theoretical problem of how to make China 
studies more relevant to mainstream disciplines, 
overcoming the double trap of isolationism and 
exceptionalism. On the other, academic freedom is 
increasingly under threat by the rising economic and 
political power of the Chinese authorities. Not only 
foreign and domestic researchers working on politically 
sensitive issues—including the topics at the core of our 
journal—face increasing difficulties in carrying out 
fieldwork in China, but the Chinese Communist Party 
has also stepped up its censorship effort, in the attempt 
to pressure international academic publishers into self-
censoring unwelcome content. All of this is happening 
while the Chinese authorities are pushing their own 
discursive agenda abroad, showering foreign academic 
institutions with much needed funding to carry out 
activities in line with the priorities of the Party. The 
three contributions included in this forum explore these 
challenges, triggering a discussion that we hope will 
continue in the following issues.
William Hurst
For almost as long as political science has 
existed as a discipline, the study of Chinese 
politics has been afflicted with a chronic disease. 
Depending on one’s perspective, this malady’s 
manifestations have amounted to either 
neglected isolation or arrogant exceptionalism. 
To treat this illness, it is important to set aside 
any rigid orthodoxy and to encourage and 
celebrate diversity and bold experimentation.
Treating What Ails 
the Study of Chinese 
Politics
For almost as long as political science has 
existed as a discipline, the study of Chinese 
politics has been afflicted with a chronic 
disease. Depending on one’s perspective, 
this malady’s manifestations have amounted 
to either neglected isolation or arrogant 
exceptionalism. At root has been a tendency 
of China scholars to recount everything 
they could learn about one village or 
neighbourhood, one leader, or one army group, 
without context or comparison, assuming the 
wider world would care simply because their 
research was about China; and then the wider 
world took little notice. Regardless of whom 
one believes may have been to blame, students 
of Chinese politics have been searching for 
curative remedies for at least the past forty-
five years.
During the 1970s and 1980s, it was en vogue 
to deploy macro-models of Chinese politics, 
both to compensate for our field’s relative 
data paucity and to make findings more 
readily intelligible to non-area specialists. 
Even when such models had names like 
Le Prêtre Marié (The Married Priest), René Magritte, 1951
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‘Mao in Command’, they still represented 
first attempts to ‘replace proper names with 
variables’. Yet, just as the last of these older-
style model debates was raging (between 
proponents of ‘civil society’ and ‘corporatism’ 
perspectives), a number of scholars sought 
to introduce greater methodological rigor 
and better demonstrate the validity of their 
findings by making use of dramatically more 
advanced survey techniques and quantitative 
analysis than had ever before been common in 
the China field. From about 1990–2005, this 
trend did indeed bring some greater visibility 
to at least some parts of the field, though 
it began to bump up against some limits of 
data availability, research costs, and political 
strictures and risks. Survey research remains 
important, but it proved not to be a panacea.
Roughly contemporaneously, from around 
1995–2010, some other scholars (including 
this writer) tried to make the study of 
Chinese politics more systematic, accurate, 
and ultimately generalisable by advocating 
for a new emphasis on subnational 
comparative analysis within China. Whether 
they compared regions, elements of the 
bureaucracy, social groups, or even time 
periods, these colleagues hoped that step-
by-step disaggregation and more careful 
attention to China’s internal diversity might 
refine the specification of hypothesised 
causal processes and mechanisms and 
enable testable claims about their scope of 
generalisability. As with the survey tradition, 
this had the potential to allow concepts and 
theories to travel more readily, not only 
into China from other parts of comparative 
politics but also in the opposite direction. 
Yet, Chinese politics never became anything 
close to a net exporter of theory or concepts 
during this period.
Racing for a Cure
Faced with the ongoing relative otiosity of 
prior therapies, alongside the stress of an ever 
more competitive and vagarious job market, 
a new generation of students has gravitated 
toward a different approach—one that is 
predicated on a sea change in the China field. 
Over more or less the past decade, Chinese 
politics has gone from a data-poor field to one 
overflowing with all manner of observable 
phenomena that can be examined, counted, 
aggregated, or analysed. In part, this has 
been driven by a technological revolution in 
both the output of content and techniques for 
‘scraping’ or otherwise ‘mining’ it, allowing 
the endless torrent of terabytes produced 
by and for the Internet to be converted 
into useful sets of ‘big data’. In part, it 
has also been based on other innovations, 
such as the use of field experiments and a 
greater propensity than among most of their 
predecessors for today’s graduate students 
and junior scholars to collaborate closely 
with leading quantitative researchers based 
in Mainland China. The preferred regimen 
of the new generation is thus to play in what 
could be called the discipline’s methods arms 
race, deploying ever more stunning technical 
tools and operations in hopes of impressing 
the discipline as a supreme virtuoso after 
the current fashion (or fad), outshining all 
others, landing a good job, and then making 
one’s mark.
Yet, while the shiny object so many are 
reaching for may be a brass ring, it is no 
silver chalice. Today’s younger scholars 
are certainly landing jobs, but the Holy 
Grail of bringing Chinese politics into the 
core of political science remains elusive 
and the concentration and compression of 
new research into increasingly small-bore 
methodological debates and frameworks risks 
the perverse effect of rendering the field even 
more marginal and less relevant. At its worst, 
scholarship in the new mould can amount 
merely to taking up concepts or hypotheses 
uncritically from American politics or 
haphazard corners of comparative politics 
and testing them out with bigger and bigger 
Chinese datasets and fancier and fancier 
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methods. Such research can end up asking 
the wrong questions, cutting itself out of 
the most essential conversations even before 
it has settled on findings. All of the current 
emphasis, for example, on discerning through 
experiments how mayors or other local 
officials in China’s consultative authoritarian 
system respond to claims from different 
social groups has produced some impressive, 
even virtuosic, articles. But all such work is 
predicated on the assumption that China’s is 
indeed a consultative authoritarian system. 
Of course, the really important question 
is whether consultative authoritarianism 
describes China very well at all (I do not think 
it does, but I would welcome a healthy debate). 
The obsessive focus on methods occludes 
the fact that a great deal of research can be 
misguided (and thus at best trivial and at 
worst wrong) from the get-go. Unfortunately, 
if such work predominates, Chinese politics 
can appear from the outside as mundane, 
epiphenomenal, or even vapidly irrelevant. 
China specialists are relegated still further 
toward the edges of the discipline, even as 
they loose their area studies moorings, and 
slowly drift toward abject obscurity.
Even at its very best, embracing the 
methods arms race constitutes but one 
candidate sanative treatment. The mad dash 
toward it since about 2010, however, has left 
other potential contenders neglected. There 
are many other ways we might bring the 
study of China’s rich historical experience, 
internal diversity, unique institutional 
landscape, and dynamic economy and society 
into conversation with the rest of political 
science. It is high time we pay attention to one 
of these: cross-national comparative analysis.
Cross-National 
Comparison: A Refreshing 
Therapy
When I speak of cross-national comparison, 
I do not mean the type that was popular 
several decades ago and sometimes amounted 
to throwing hundreds of country-case (or 
even worse country-year) scores into a 
statistical package and seeing which broad 
claims might stick (e.g.: democracies do not 
fight, unions strike less under left-leaning 
governments, etc.). Rather, I wish to advocate 
for careful paired comparison of China with 
other individual countries or small sets 
of countries. Combining this with careful, 
historically and contextually informed, 
work on China’s domestic politics—whether 
quantitative, qualitative, subnationally 
comparative, or other—has the potential to 
let us export ideas and arguments at least as 
well as brandishing the latest technical tools 
to test others’ hypotheses.
Broadly speaking, there are four ways to 
undertake the kind of cross-national work 
I am advocating. I call them: shadows, 
mirrors, partners, and apples. I have listed 
these in increasing order of both their 
risks and difficulty and of their potential 
dividends. Shadow comparisons are the sort 
that one finds in the concluding chapters of 
old books—not only the ones about China, 
but also many with titles like ‘XXX’s Party 
System in Comparative Perspective’. After 
offering the reader a study of politics in a 
single country (e.g. China), authors would 
pad a last chapter full of vignettes about 
how the arguments might be applied to 
another country or set of countries, almost 
always based entirely on a very superficial 
reading of a thin set of secondary sources. 
This is not useless (I have done it), but it is 
of limited utility. Still, it remains all too rare 
in the writing of China specialists. Mirror 
comparisons involve a much more nuanced 
look at one or two countries that in some 
important way reflect China’s political reality 
as analysed or explained in the main body of 
a work. This might involve at least a chapter 
or two, also likely (but not necessarily) drawn 
from secondary sources, that delve into 
considerable detail to examine how causal 
processes and mechanisms uncovered in the 
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rest of a book play out in a critical case or set 
of cases for testing whether they might travel 
beyond China’s borders. This has become 
popular in recent work on India and other 
large countries, but has remained largely 
unexploited by students of Chinese politics. 
More common in studies of international 
relations, partner comparisons revolve 
around the study of China’s relationships with 
a particular other country or set of countries 
(e.g. Japan or the Soviet Union). Such 
comparisons usually become the main focus 
of the books based on them and often (but not 
always) can require relatively in-depth and 
extensive, though tightly focused, fieldwork 
and/or primary source research in a country 
other than China. Apples comparisons carry 
by far the highest costs and risks, but also the 
greatest potential rewards.
In an apples comparison, a researcher 
endeavours to compare China and some other 
country (or set of countries) side-by-side as 
co-equal units; that is, to compare ‘apples 
to apples’. Doing so in a way that remains 
faithful to the immense internal diversity 
and complexity of politics in China requires 
nothing short of training up fully in the 
language, history, and politics of another 
country (or multiple other countries), to at 
least a roughly similar level of expertise that 
the researcher had acquired on the China case. 
This means many years of language study, at 
least a small library’s worth of reading, and 
even more time spent on the ground in the 
field in a new country. There is thus little 
chance that any single scholar can cultivate 
more than one or a very small number of 
apples to compare with China during his or 
her career. Apple comparisons can be tricky 
and are often complicated by uneven access 
to data, vastly divergent political strictures 
or economic contexts, or the absence of key 
actors or events in either China or the apple 
comparator; furthermore, not every apple 
will be suitable for comparison with China 
on all possible research questions or areas. 
Nevertheless, investment in developing 
apple comparisons can be incredibly fruitful. 
Such a method enables one to deploy most-
similar and most-different systems designs 
simultaneously (one within each case and 
the other between), for example, to compare 
subnational units or phenomena across 
national boundaries, and to test the limits 
and scope of generalisability not only in 
terms of broad causal arguments but also 
very precisely of specific causal mechanisms. 
Concepts developed to characterise elements 
of Chinese politics can be refined in the full 
light of another case before being offered as 
wares for export to a broader comparative 
politics audience.
Comparing China with 
Southeast Asia: A Modest 
Proposal
When China scholars have attempted 
comparisons—of any of the four types 
just discussed—they have often selected 
India or Russia as comparators. These are 
certainly not bad choices, but they are 
difficult in important ways and lacking in 
a certain kind of comparative advantage. 
With secondary literatures and area studies 
scholarly traditions as vast or even larger 
than those on China, Russia and India 
require an especially large amount of up-
front investment to get up to speed. Research 
on these countries has also tended to favour 
a similar sort of disaggregation, close-to-
the-ground fieldwork, and a ‘splitting’ (as 
opposed to ‘lumping’) approach to that which 
has classically characterised much work 
on Chinese politics. In this, they lack any 
comparative advantage that might be conferred 
by having strengths complementary to the 
China field’s. Thus, adding new innovation 
or knowledge through comparative analysis 
is particularly difficult. Though one could 
certainly look elsewhere (from Mongolia to 
Mexico) with excellent results, I propose that 
many countries of Southeast Asia (Myanmar, 
MADE IN CHINA - FORUM58
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) can 
be especially apt comparator cases for the 
kinds of cross-national work on China I am 
advocating.
The study of politics (as opposed to culture, 
history, or society) in Southeast Asia has 
suffered from an opposite pathology to that 
which has plagued the China field. Rather 
than assuming the wider field would care 
about their findings because they were rooted 
in the study of Southeast Asian countries, 
specialists on that part of the world have 
too often tended to assume the field would 
never care about their findings because they 
were derived from the study of Southeast 
Asia. This has led a lot of scholarship to 
focus tightly on what is generalisable or 
exportable about Southeast Asian countries’ 
experiences or outcomes, rather than what is 
unique; never to miss the forest for the trees, 
but often to emphasise the broad shape of 
the landscape without even naming the tree 
species present. In sum, Southeast Asian 
politics offers a comparative advantage as a 
comparator area because it has focused on 
exactly the areas the China field has neglected 
or been weak in and has tended too often to 
neglect exactly the areas (e.g.: local variation, 
subnational politics, etc.) on which the 
China field has done well. Also, none of the 
countries of Southeast Asia have area studies 
or secondary literatures of similar volume to 
those associated with Russia or India (indeed, 
other than those on Vietnam, Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia, secondary 
literatures on Southeast Asian countries’ 
politics and history are comparatively quite 
small). The costs are thus relatively low, 
the comparative advantages obvious, and 
the payoffs potentially very high for using 
Southeast Asian countries as comparison 
cases to bring the study of Chinese politics 
into closer dialogue with the rest of political 
science. I very much hope more students 
and colleagues will heed this call to consider 
delving into these and other country cases 
seriously for this purpose.
All Hands Needed on 
Deck
To conclude, I do not intend this essay to 
be any sort of definitive or final statement. 
Rather, I hope it may spark important 
conversations. I am more than happy to 
be corrected or invited to rethink any and 
all aspects of what I have said here. My 
greatest aspiration is to motivate colleagues 
and students to think more expansively and 
daringly about what is possible and desirable 
in terms of Chinese politics research. There is 
nothing wrong with technical sophistication 
in one’s methods and there is absolutely a 
rightful place for research using ‘big data’, 
experiments, and other new tools. But we 
must prevent the stifling homogeneity of the 
methods arms race from becoming completely 
ensconced and crowding out all other work 
(especially by younger or emerging scholars). 
Diversity and bold experimentation must win 
out over any rigid orthodoxy if we have any 
chance to put our patient’s illness fully into 
remission.
William Hurst
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Christian Sorace
In his powerful essay, William Hurst raised the 
question of how to make the study of Chinese 
politics relevant to the discipline of political 
science. Yet, the prevailing question should 
not be ‘how do we make China relevant to the 
discipline?’, but ‘how can the study of China help 
us rethink the study and practice of comparative 
politics?
Let a Hundred 
Flowers Bloom
A Response to William 
Hurst on the Field of 
Chinese Politics
In his essay ‘Treating What Ails the Study 
of Chinese Politics’, included in this issue 
of Made in China, William Hurst raises the 
question of how to make the study of Chinese 
politics relevant to political science. I applaud 
and entirely agree with Hurst’s diagnosis that 
the study of Chinese politics risks falling 
into obscurity if it focuses obsessively on 
methodological sophistication at the expense 
of substantive questions (personal disclosure: 
Hurst was my dissertation advisor and 
remains a close friend). I would, however, 
like to offer a different remedy for some of the 
field’s other symptoms. The primary question 
should not be how do we make China relevant 
to the discipline?, but how can the study of 
China help us rethink the study and practice of 
comparative politics?
About half way through his essay, Hurst 
puts his finger on a key issue: although 
scholars may have access to ‘bigger and 
bigger Chinese data sets and fancier and 
fancier methods’, what research questions 
are they posing? What kind of work is being 
done with these data, and in the service of 
Traditional Chinese Watercolor Painting, Unknown author.
MADE IN CHINA - FORUM60
what kinds of arguments? As Hurst puts it, 
‘such research can end up asking the wrong 
questions, cutting itself out of the most 
essential conversations before it has settled 
on findings.’ Hurst’s preferred solution to 
these trends is cross-national comparison, 
grounded in linguistic competence and 
time-intensive fieldwork, especially (though 
not exclusively or even necessarily) with 
countries in Southeast Asia. While I am 
not opposed to this approach (in fact, my 
new research project is a cross-subnational 
comparison of urbanisation patterns in 
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, and several localities 
in China’s Inner Mongolia), Hurst’s proposed 
corrective stops short of a more radical and 
exciting possibility to overhaul the study of 
comparative politics.
What China Can Teach Us 
About Ourselves?
What can we learn about politics from 
how it is conceptualised and practiced 
in China? Recently, in my Politics of 
China undergraduate seminar, comparisons 
between China and the United States kept 
spontaneously arising in conversation. On the 
one hand, reference to the US is inevitable, 
as it is the frame of reference for most of my 
students. On the other hand, our discussions 
readily leapt to technologies of control and 
discursive production in China alongside 
those in the United States. During our class 
on Communist Party propaganda, my students 
directed the conversation to instances of US 
patriotism, public discourse after 9/11, and 
the current political banishment of NFL 
Quarterback Colin Kaepernick. Although 
these measures were not government-
imposed, they are still forms of control, 
policing behaviour, and silencing or erasure 
of dissident voices. In examining practices 
that cut across both authoritarian states and 
democracies, we can start asking difficult 
and uncomfortable questions about our own 
political environments.
While still acknowledging and studying 
respective institutional and historical 
contexts, we can de-exoticise China and tease 
out commonalities as well as differences. 
I suggest that we examine practices—at 
least in addition to institutions or bounded 
comparative units—as a fruitful avenue of 
inquiry. Comparative politics can be (among 
other things) about generating experiences 
of the uncanny—or the disturbing recognition 
of familiarity in an unfamiliar place. It is 
salutary to be reminded that we may not be 
as democratic as some would like to believe. 
Conversely, this practice-oriented approach 
can also limn differences between political 
systems, and remind us why some of our 
beloved conditions of possibility may be in 
need of passionate defence against those who 
desire to extinguish them.
An inspiration for this methodological 
approach is Lisa Wedeen’s claim that there 
can be democratic practices in authoritarian 
states (a claim which cannot be seen if one 
is only looking at institutions as units of 
comparison based on deeply engrained 
binary and normative assumptions about 
how those institutions organise political 
life)! In the China field broadly construed 
to include political theory, Leigh Jenco’s 
project of building ‘global theory’ is based 
on the premise that thinking born in local 
conditions can ‘produce new and broader 
insight into social and political conditions 
elsewhere.’ Jenco’s own work (and the 
collective projects she has organised) 
are welcome antidotes to the tendency to 
indiscriminately apply Foucault to everything 
(I write this half-jokingly as someone who 
loves Foucault’s work and often references 
it). Will comparative political scientists 
working on China engage ‘global theory’? 
Sadly, probably only a few, as the intra-
disciplinary boundaries between comparative 
politics and political theory stifle research 
projects that attempt to do two things at 
once (perhaps I am being hyperbolic but it 
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is in order to emphasise a point). In the field 
of comparative politics, Maria Repnikova’s 
excellent new book starts from in-depth 
empirical analysis of how critical journalists 
understand and pursue their own work, and 
its relationship to the state, and on that basis 
she demolishes the stereotype of an inevitably, 
and normatively, adversarial relationship 
between the media and state. 
Reinforced Structural 
Marginalisation
What Hurst calls ‘the methods arm race’ 
is structurally reproduced by the conditions 
of training graduate students, journal 
gatekeeping, and career prospects. Is it 
irresponsible to train a graduate student to 
adopt a qualitative methodological approach 
to Chinese politics? Which disciplinary 
venues will they publish their findings in? 
Will mainstream political scientists recognise 
their work as genuinely comparative and 
not as some hybrid whose language is at 
the margins of intelligibility? Will they 
fall through the cracks of heavily policed 
disciplinary boundaries? Under these 
institutional conditions, to encourage a 
qualitative approach that interrogates the 
definitions and practices of the political in 
China, would set a PhD student down a path 
of obscurity and increase the difficulties 
of landing a tenure-track position in an 
already cut-throat environment of neoliberal 
competition. Of course it is possible to make 
it work, and I would like to think of myself 
as a positive example (and there are others 
who often land in different disciplines), but 
the question remains: is it advisable? Over 
the years many people have attempted to 
dissuade me (with a few notable exceptions) 
from pursuing a qualitative approach and line 
of questioning precisely out of concerns for 
my future ‘hire-ability’.
The bizarre thing is that nearly everyone 
admits in private conversation that the field is 
In 1968 a cohort of politically 
engaged young academics established 
the Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars (CCAS). Critical of the field of 
Asian Studies and its complicity with 
the United States’ policies in Vietnam, 
the CCAS mounted a sweeping attack 
on the field’s academic, political, and 
financial structures. While the CCAS 
included scholars of Japan, Korea, and 
South and Southeast Asia, the committee 
focussed on Maoist China, as it offered 
the possibility of an alternative politics 
and the transformation of the meaning of 
labour and the production of knowledge. 
In The End of Concern, Fabio Lanza 
traces the complete history of the CCAS, 
outlining how its members worked to 
merge their politics and activism with 
their scholarship. Lanza’s story exceeds 
the intellectual history and legacy of the 
CCAS, however; he narrates a moment of 
transition in Cold War politics and how 
Maoist China influenced activists and 
intellectuals around the world, becoming 
a central element in the political upheaval 
of the long 1960s. (Buy the book here)
READING SUGGESTION
Fabio Lanza’s The End of 
Concern  (Duke University 
Press, 2017)
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going in the wrong direction, even some of the 
people at the forefront of the ‘methods arms 
race’! I have heard this refrain of discontent 
from people across the academic spectrum: 
junior, senior, qualitative, quantitative, top-
tier research university, small liberal arts 
colleges, and so on.
The question is: what are we going to do 
about it? Are we going to organise the same 
conferences and panel themes ad nauseam out 
fear of rejection? Are we going to allow big 
data to do the work of thinking for us? The 
reason I am passionate about this topic is that 
China is a place with endless lessons to teach 
us about our lives as political creatures and 
a world held in common. Methodology can 
shape (and sometimes constrain) what kinds 
of questions get asked, and what other kinds 
do not get asked. It therefore bears upon how 
we think about and engage the world, and 
we must engage it reflexively, critically, and 
forthrightly.
To achieve the modest goals I propose, 
it does not matter whether one’s preferred 
method or tools are quantitative or 
qualitative. What is essential is to direct 
methodological antennae toward what is 
happening on the ground in China. Rather 
than approach China as a case that might 
confirm or disprove political science puzzles 
generated in other institutional contexts, 
we should allow our research questions to 
develop in response to and conversation 
with the contexts they seek to explain. In 
other words, inductively building theory from 
the ground up that can then speak back to 
other contexts and support a more robust 
understanding of politics the world over.
Conclusion: A Call for 
Intellectual Generosity
I am not attempting to preach that everyone 
must abandon the church of big data for 
the gospel of qualitative transcripts—I 
like to think of myself as methodologically 
ecumenical. There is excellent work being 
done in both camps, across them, between 
them, and beside them. Unfortunately, a 
deficit of intellectual generosity and curiosity 
prevents certain kinds of questions from being 
asked. Of course, no one can be expected to 
have a limitless archive, or to read everything 
that comes across one’s desk with careful 
consideration. There is never enough time in 
the day to read all that one wants to read, let 
alone articles and books with faint relevance 
to one’s own interests. That is not something 
that can be changed. What can be cultivated 
is a willingness to be surprised in one’s own 
convictions about what counts as ‘political 
science’ based on the realisation that an 
interesting question is after all an interesting 
question.
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Nicholas Loubere
Ivan Franceschini
On 18 August it was revealed that Cambridge 
University Press had complied with the demands 
of Chinese government censors to block access 
on its website in China to hundreds of ‘politically 
sensitive’ articles published in its prestigious 
The China Quarterly journal. The ensuing 
debate has generally overlooked the problematic 
nature of the commercial academic publishing 
industry. Isn’t it time to take the profit motive 
out of the equation and to rediscover a certain 
measure of idealism in academia?
Beyond the Great 
Paywall 
A Lesson from the 
Cambridge University 
Press China Incident
Photo: Oleksandr Mudretsov, 123rf.com.
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On 18 August it was revealed that Cambridge 
University Press (CUP) had complied with 
the demands of Chinese government censors 
to block access on its website in China to 
over three hundred ‘politically sensitive’ 
articles published in its prestigious The 
China Quarterly journal. This move was met 
with outrage in the academic community and 
beyond, with scholars criticising the Chinese 
government for the unprecedented extension 
of its heavy-handed censorship into foreign-
language academia, and CUP for acquiescing to 
the demands. Prompted by this harsh response, 
on 21 August CUP reversed its stance, restoring 
access to the censored contents for its Chinese 
audience and making them available free of 
charge for all. While the reversal is certainly 
welcome and highlights the power that 
coordinated action on the part of the academic 
community can have, we feel that the ensuing 
debate has overlooked an issue of fundamental 
importance: the problematic nature of the 
commercial academic publishing industry. 
While CUP is listed as a charitable organisation, 
it is also a highly profitable operation. It brings 
in hundreds of millions of pounds in yearly 
revenues, and has extensive commercial 
interests in the Chinese market. As such, it 
should be unsurprising that they would be 
tempted to submit to such a request in order 
to preserve their access to Chinese consumers, 
even if we find it distasteful that they 
framed their choice as a pragmatic effort to 
continue long-term engagement with China. 
In light of this, we believe that this incident 
should not only be viewed as the exceptional 
capitulation of one specific publisher to China, 
but also as representative of a wider capitulation 
of academic publishing to commercial interests.
The Contradiction of 
Contemporary Academic 
Publishing
While there is certainly plenty of well 
justified outrage to go around, this incident 
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exposes a paradox at the heart of contemporary 
academic publishing and its supposed role in 
the promotion of academic freedom—the fact 
that academics are required to hand over their 
research, which is usually supported by public 
funding, to publishers whose primary goal is 
to earn profit rather than make the material 
freely accessible to as wide an audience 
as possible. In addition to the The China 
Quarterly, most of the main journals in China 
Studies are currently published by major 
profit-oriented publishers—such as the China 
Journal (University of Chicago Press), 
the Journal of Contemporary China (Taylor & 
Francis), and Modern China (SAGE). These 
publishers charge exorbitant prices for 
access to the articles. For instance, Taylor & 
Frances charges forty-two USD for twenty-
four-hour access to an article in the Journal 
of Contemporary China, effectively blocking 
anyone who does not have access through 
an institution that pays for the costly 
subscription. It might even be argued that 
this oppressive paywall system represents 
a different—and probably even much wider 
and more noxious—form of censorship than 
any imposed by the Chinese government. 
Indeed, while CUP’s capitulation would have 
blocked access for a relatively small number 
of Chinese academics, the vast majority 
of Chinese citizens (as well as citizens 
elsewhere) are already blocked by the ‘great 
paywall’ of profit-oriented publishing.
It is important to remember that that 
academic publishing was not always like this. 
Many academic journals used to be published 
by scholarly associations or universities that 
were not seeking to maximise profits, but 
were rather aiming to simply cover their 
operational costs in order to further research 
in their fields. Journals also used to be 
motivated by broader academic ideals that 
went beyond the simple aspiration to achieve a 
higher ‘impact factor’. This idealism justified 
the request that scholars provide the unpaid 
labour needed to keep these publications 
in operation by serving on editorial boards 
and doing peer-reviews—i.e. the work that 
actually makes the publications academic.
Open Access as a Viable 
Alternative
While the current situation is undoubtedly 
dire, there are obvious and workable 
alternatives to this system. A number of 
university presses, such as Amsterdam 
University Press and UCL Press, now offer 
open access options for their authors, and 
ANU Press is fully open access. Since scholars 
already do the editing and peer reviewing for 
all academic publications free of charge, the 
same people who populate the editorial boards 
of top journals and send out peer review 
requests could, conceivably, do the same work 
for open access publications. In fact, there 
are already a few successful examples of high 
quality open access journals in China Studies. 
For instance, the Journal of Current Chinese 
Affairs (JCCA) is published open access by 
the German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies. The JCCA has a highly respected 
editorial board, and its submissions undergo 
the same rigorous peer review process as any 
profit-oriented publication. The operation 
of the JCCA is facilitated by an open source 
publishing software called Open Journal 
Systems, which automates the submission 
process and much of the other work done by 
large publishers. The success of the JCCA 
points to the fact that, with a small budget 
to hire editorial assistants and a dedicated 
group of academics, it is possible to produce 
top-quality and rigorously peer-reviewed 
publications that are open to everyone and 
not profit-oriented. Unsurprisingly, however, 
the JCCA is not given its due recognition by 
the academic publishing establishment. It is 
not listed in Thomson Reuters’ Social Science 
Citation Index nor is it given an ‘official’ 
impact factor by the corporation. This 
makes the journal a risky choice for early 
career academics needing to publish articles 
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that ‘count’ for tenure. It is also unclear 
how monographs published by open access 
university presses are viewed by tenure 
committees.
In short, there are options available for 
academics to publish rigorously peer-
reviewed journal articles and books that are 
open to a much wider audience. Our first 
attempt at a ‘proper’ open access academic 
publication—the Made in China Yearbook 
2016: Disturbances in Heaven, published by 
ANU Press this February—was downloaded 
more than four thousand times in only the 
first two months after publication, far more 
than the standard print run of three to five 
hundred copies produced by traditional 
publishers. In our opinion, besides leading 
to rightful condemnations of the censorship 
of the Chinese authorities and the vacillating 
behaviour of CUP, the recent incident should 
give academics pause when considering how 
to publish academic research, as well as the 
kind of academic work they engage in with 
the publishing industry. It will take senior 
academics to lead the way by establishing 
open access journals with quality editorial 
boards that ensure the highest standards—i.e. 
the work that is already done free of charge 
for large profit-oriented publishers. Senior 
academics should also explicitly signal to 
early career scholars and their institutions 
that high-quality open access publications are 
worth just as much as their profit-oriented 
counterparts for tenure and promotion.
Rediscovering Idealism
Ultimately, while the academic community 
should rightly be outraged over CUP’s initial 
capitulation to China’s demands, and worried 
about the increasing ability of Beijing to 
silence discourse it does not agree with both 
within and outside China, we believe that 
this incident exposes a much more serious 
threat to academic freedom represented 
by the wholesale adoption of commercial 
modes of academic publishing. CUP may 
have reversed its decision to capitulate to 
the Chinese censors, but there is a significant 
risk that other publishers, prompted by the 
same commercial incentives, will opt to 
self-censor. Indeed, under the condition of 
anonymity multiple publishers at the Beijing 
International Book Fair in August admitted to 
censoring content, and LexisNexis has also 
been revealed to have removed products in 
China at the request of the censors. As the 
country’s economic might continues to grow, 
the party-state will find itself with more and 
more ability to directly influence the content 
of multinational profit-oriented publishers 
seeking access to the huge Chinese market. 
In this environment, the only way that we can 
preserve academic freedom from overreach 
from governments or other powerful 
economic actors is to take the profit motive 
out of the equation by rediscovering a certain 
measure of idealism and ensuring free access 
to our scholarship.
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In the Shadow of Kem Ley
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Astrid Norén-Nilsson
The assassination of political analyst Kem Ley 
in Phnom Penh in July 2016 suggests that civil 
society touches a nerve of great sensibility in 
today’s Cambodia. Cambodian democracy is 
currently experiencing its tensest period in 
two decades. If civil society plays a role in this 
context, it is not primarily within the traditional 
confines of the associational realm. Rather, in 
looking for a civil society challenge to party 
politics, we will have to shift our attention away 
from NGOs to the tentative emergence of social 
movements and to the fledgling grassroots 
democracy movement which Kem Ley himself 
spearheaded.
In the Shadow of 
Kem Ley 
Is Civil Society the 
Solution to Cambodia’s 
Woes?
Kem Ley’s funeral procession in July, 2016’ Photo: Rappler.com
On 10 July 2016, independent political 
analyst and grassroots organiser Kem Ley was 
shot dead while having his morning coffee at 
a Caltex petrol station in central Phnom Penh. 
Two weeks later, an estimated two million 
people took to the streets to join in his funeral 
procession. This was the first mass social 
mobilisation to take place in Cambodia after 
the early 2014 crackdown, which had reined 
in the largest anti-government protests in at 
least fifteen years. 
In 2016, Cambodian civil society played 
a very different role in the making of the 
mass mobilisations compared to previous 
demonstrations. In 2013, the unprecedented 
fearlessness with which ordinary Cambodians 
took to the streets seemed to be evidence that 
civil society was entering a new era. Though 
protesters were motivated by a diverse list 
of grievances, at that time Cambodia was 
marked by a sharp polarisation between the 
incumbent Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 
and the opposition, the Cambodia National 
Rescue Party (CNRP), with the latter 
claiming the right to interpret and represent 
demands for ‘change’. On the contrary, in 
2016, people came out to pay their respects 
to a civil society veteran who had sought to 
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radically transform Cambodian politics by 
reforming both political parties according to 
civil society principles. 
Kem Ley’s assassination and subsequent 
martyrdom suggest that civil society—as an 
untapped potential—touches a nerve of great 
sensibility in today’s Cambodia. Cambodian 
democracy is currently experiencing its 
tensest period in two decades: since the CNRP 
came within reach of an electoral victory over 
the CPP in 2013, the two main parties have 
been locked in a life and death struggle. If 
civil society plays a role in this context, it is 
not primarily within the traditional confines 
of the associational realm. Rather, in looking 
for a civil society challenge to party politics, 
we will have to shift our attention away 
from NGOs, to the tentative emergence 
of social movements and to the fledgling 
grassroots democracy movement that Kem 
Ley spearheaded. 
The Limitations and 
Possibilities of Cambodian 
Civil Society 
Ever since their appearance in the early 
1990s, Cambodian NGOs have taken on a 
large share of the functions that typically 
belong to the state. Still, they have always 
had to face serious limitations in their work. 
While recognising the value of the resources 
and services provided by NGOs for national 
development, the CPP has circumscribed 
and undermined NGOs that focus on 
governance and human rights issues, as well 
as independent youth organisations and 
trade unions. Most often, the relationship 
between the Cambodian state and civil 
society is understood to be competitive, with 
the CPP government shaping and restricting 
the environment in which associational 
activity can emerge. Others argue instead 
that the relationship is mutual, with NGOs 
and other civil society organisations (CSOs) 
confined to pursuing their objectives through 
manoeuvrings within the space provided by 
the state. 
Accompanying a gradual decline in foreign 
aid, the Cambodian state is now attempting to 
restrict the space available to a growing civil 
society. In August 2015, a highly controversial 
Law on NGOs and Associations was passed, 
restricting civil society’s right to freedom 
of association and expression, and enabling 
the government to shut down organisations 
that criticise it. Less than one year later, 
in April 2016, the Trade Union Law was 
passed, which provides protection and 
support to government-backed unions while 
undermining independent unions. 
In October 2014, within this stifling 
overall context, a number of civil society 
veterans, with Kem Ley at the centre, 
initiated the ‘Khmer for Khmer’ advocacy 
group—a network of civil society leaders and 
activists who pledged to promote democratic 
party politics by engaging citizens in the 
political process. The ambition of the 
Khmer for Khmer network was to achieve 
the democratising potential of civil society, 
not from inside the shrinking space allowed 
by the state, but by exporting civil society 
actors and principles to party politics. Their 
aspiration to bring forward political change 
via grassroots empowerment represented an 
extension of the international NGO discourse 
on empowerment. 
Kem Ley and his associates reckoned that 
two decades of the burgeoning NGO sector 
had produced a huge potential for grassroots 
leadership—a force that had not yet been 
felt by the political system. Cambodian 
democratisation, they reasoned, would benefit 
from inserting civil society leaders into the 
Cambodian political system. It was with this 
aim in mind that in August 2015, the founders 
of the Khmer for Khmer network launched 
the Grassroots Democracy Party (GDP). The 
Party was meant to provide an avenue for 
ordinary Cambodians with good leadership 
skills—typically civil society leaders—to 
enter the political field. Significantly, it was 
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not only the initiators and leaders of the GDP 
who had long-term experience working with 
NGOs and other CSOs, but also most party 
rank-and-file activists.
‘Grassrootism’ as Party 
Politics?
The movement for grassroots democracy 
not only reflects disillusionment with the 
limitations circumscribing traditional civil 
society work in Cambodia, but it is also an 
attempt to break down these constraints by 
entering the all-important arena of party 
politics. In this sense, it points to the absolute 
primacy of party politics for effecting change 
in Cambodia today. On top of the Khmer for 
Khmer network’s agenda was the creation 
of microparties around the country—local 
development parties set up to empower those 
at the grassroots to become policy-makers. 
Though these have been slow to take off, the 
GDP was intended as an umbrella party for 
one hundred micro-parties that were to be 
established. 
This suggests that the reintroduction of 
multi-party politics in Cambodia in 1993 has 
been a success, to the extent that there is a 
widespread belief in the country that hope for 
political change resides in political parties. 
Still, the grassroots agenda relates uneasily to 
party politics. Early on, the Khmer for Khmer 
network denied speculations that it would 
create its own party, claiming that its mission 
was only to build and strengthen grassroots 
political leadership. The group then subtly 
changed its course with the establishment 
of the GDP, which was set up to function 
as an incubator for the practice of ‘intra-
party democracy’. The aim was to nurture 
democratic leaders within the political 
party to work as a team, rather than rely on 
top leaders. In this sense, ‘grassrootism’ is 
a principle that could be emulated by other 
political parties. Indeed, in my interviews 
with GDP activists, many have stated that 
they envisage grassroots mobilisation being 
taken up by all Cambodian political parties in 
the future.
Yet, this all-encompassing ambition, which 
involved the transformation of all political 
parties, underscores a fundamental ambiguity 
in the creation of a particular political party 
vehicle for the grassroots agenda. Upon the 
creation of the GDP, Kem Ley distanced 
himself from the new party, only taking on an 
advisory role similar to the one he maintained 
for the CNRP. My interviews with his 
associates suggest that Kem Ley dissociated 
himself from the GDP precisely because 
he maintained an aspiration to change the 
Cambodian political landscape without 
participating in a specific political party. Kem 
Ley primarily aspired to be a coordinator 
among actors: his idea was to connect himself 
with different groups in society so as to be a 
focal point for the organisation of change. 
Kem Ley aspired to be a charismatic leader 
who could reach out to, and be accepted by, 
all different societal groups. This would set 
him apart from other charismatic political 
leaders, such as the CNRP’s Sam Rainsy and 
Kem Sokha, who took a partisan, oppositional 
stance. The ambition to apolitically or 
consensually represent all of society is a 
vestige of civil society thinking, and one that 
eclipses the party political avenue. 
 
Cambodian opposition leader Kem Sokha was 
arrested in September 2017. 
Photo: Yahoo News
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Roads Ahead
Civil society as an animating idea that 
transcends the confines of associational life 
is an important force in today’s Cambodia, 
but one that has not quite found its place. 
The politicisation of civil society by civil 
society activists themselves is an attempt to 
find an outlet for these grassroots energies. A 
grassroots model of democracy could disrupt 
the unequal relationships between ordinary 
citizens and local-level authorities that has 
been fundamental to the CPP’s hold on power, 
particularly in this context where the existing 
pattern of local-level politics is already being 
undermined by demographic change. A civil 
society model of citizenship may be more 
explosive than that of political opposition. 
Yet, ironically, the potential for bottom-up 
grassroots democracy is so intimately tied 
to the charismatic leader championing it—
Kem Ley—that his assassination has eclipsed 
its prospects, at least for the time being. 
Whilst two million Cambodians turned out 
for Kem Ley’s funeral in 2016, the GDP won 
merely five seats out of more than eleven 
thousand in the commune elections that took 
place in 2017. This is not the first time that 
a massive turnout of Cambodian citizens at 
the funeral of a beloved, charismatic leader 
fails to translate into political momentum. 
At Norodom Sihanouk’s funeral procession 
in February 2013, about one million people 
poured into the streets to mourn the King-
Father. Yet, in national elections the same 
year, the royalist party FUNCINPEC for the 
first time failed to win a single seat, and the 
party has since all but disintegrated. The 
lesson is that in Cambodia today charisma 
is a powerful political force, but political 
opportunity does not outlive charismatic 
individuals. The CPP is acutely aware of 
the potential for charismatic leadership 
to undermine the party’s authority. Since 
February 2017, five leaders of CNRP have 
been deposed—three of whom were arrested. 
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Amendments to the Law on Political Parties 
in July 2017 have criminalised interaction 
between parties and convicts, with the 
aim of erasing individual leaders from the 
political scene. This has been a largely 
successful strategy in that it has rendered 
long-time opposition leader Sam Rainsy less 
visible on all-important social media, with 
CNRP activists now afraid to interact with 
Rainsy’s page. A mere two months later, in 
September, his substitute Kem Sokha was 
arrested on charges of treason and now 
languishes in jail. For what concerns the GDP, 
the unassuming profiles of its current top 
troika—Yang Saing Khoma, Sam Inn, and Yeng 
Virak—put definite limits on the prospects 
of the fledgling grassroots movement they 
now lead. Still, civil society sensibilities are 
evidently close to today’s popular aspirations. 
In such a fragile and tense context dominated 
by political parties, the dilemma for civil 
society leaders will be how to rebuild a bridge 
of intensely felt popular ambitions in the 
absence of a charismatic leader. 
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After spending years advocating for human and 
civil rights in China, Ai Weiwei is now employing 
his artistic abilities and his sizeable social media 
presence to sensitise the West to the plight of the 
refugees who attempt to reach Europe from the 
Middle East and Africa. In doing so, he is putting 
European governments rather than the Chinese 
state ‘on trial’ while adding a ‘transcultural’ 
dimension to his work. Still, even his most recent 
endeavours stem from the same philosophy he has 
espoused throughout his career.
Giorgio Strafella
Daria Berg 
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At least 5,079 people died in the 
Mediterranean Sea during 2016 while 
attempting to reach Europe’s shores. 
While many Europeans have responded 
to the struggle of the refugees and other 
migrants from the Middle East and Africa 
with either fear or indifference, a Chinese 
artiste engagé based in Berlin has employed 
installations, documentary filmmaking, as 
well as a sizeable social media presence to 
try and sensitise the West to this on-going 
tragedy. Ai Weiwei represents one of the 
most influential figures in the global art 
scene and his exhibitions attract hundreds 
of thousands of visitors around the world—
since 2015 even in China, although his recent 
shows in Beijing do not feature his most 
explicitly ‘political’ artworks. His stature as 
an artist notwithstanding, it was Ai Weiwei’s 
advocacy of human and civil rights in China—
and the price he paid for his outspokenness, 
including eighty-one days in jail and a brain 
haemorrhage—that established him as a 
celebrity dissident in the West at the end of 
the past decade. Ai Weiwei’s most critical 
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art and activism now address the condition 
of refugees, rather than Chinese society, 
putting European governments rather than 
the Chinese state ‘on trial’ while adding 
a ‘transcultural’ dimension to his work. 
Nevertheless, as we shall argue in this essay, 
Ai Weiwei’s most recent work stems from the 
same philosophy he has espoused throughout 
his career.
Clarity and Awakening
Ai Weiwei states that ‘freedom of speech, 
human rights are related to my early struggle, 
or my family’s or the whole generation’s 
struggle, in fighting for those basic rights.’ 
As every Chinese person who has ever heard 
of Ai Weiwei knows, he is the son of Ai Qing 
(1910–1996), a famous poet imprisoned by 
the Kuomintang in the 1930s for his leftist 
activism. Despite the mutual admiration 
between Mao Zedong and Ai Qing, the 
Communist Party persecuted him between 
1957 and 1978, exiling his whole family 
from Beijing to the western provinces. At 
the onset of the Reform and Opening era in 
1978–1979, Ai Weiwei joined an experimental 
artistic movement known as the Stars Group 
(Xingxing). After the authorities shut down 
the Stars Group exhibition in Beijing on 1 
October 1979, artists, poets, and intellectuals 
staged street protests demanding freedom of 
expression and fusing artistic creativity with 
political activism. Ai Weiwei’s early encounter 
with Western society also contributed to 
shaping his political and artistic sensibilities. 
While living in New York between 1981 and 
1993, Ai Weiwei studied the works of artists 
who still greatly influence his art to this 
day—such as Warhol, Beuys, Duchamp, and 
Kosuth. During this time, he also witnessed 
Ai Weiwei’s Laundromat (2016) as currently exhibited at the National Gallery in Prague (Trade Fair 
Palace). Photo: Giorgio Strafella, 14 April 2017.
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the limits of, and the struggle for, civil rights 
in a Western democracy. 
Ai Weiwei’s theoretical writings on art 
published since the mid-1990s reveal the roots 
of the disposition and method that one finds 
in his on-going exploration of the refugee 
crisis as well as in his earlier works. In a 1997 
artistic manifesto entitled ‘Making Choices’ 
(zuochu xuanze), the artist wrote that art 
ought to embody a critical reflection of the 
actual human condition and the ‘awakened’ 
artist’s ‘vigilance on society and the crisis 
of humanity.’ Here Ai Weiwei envisages 
a new modernist movement founded on 
the liberation of humanity and the victory 
of the ‘humanitarian spirit’ (rendaozhuyi 
jingshen), coupling a critique of traditional 
definitions of art with a reflection on the 
existential condition that should lead to 
doubt, befuddlement, and finally ‘awakening’ 
(juewu). Awakened artists, he hopes, will in 
turn awaken the rest of society by exposing 
reality ‘unpolished and unvarnished’ and its 
intrinsic ‘terror, emptiness, and boredom.’ 
Rather than leading to cynicism and inaction, 
this stance is closely linked to Ai Weiwei’s 
activism in that he believes artists who do 
so become a ‘virus’ of change by priming 
society to imagine and desire change. As Ai 
Weiwei wrote in 2013, first ‘you need people 
to recognize they need change. Then, you 
need them to recognize how to make change. 
Finally, change will come.’ Echoing the 
wider intellectual debate of those years, 
in the 1990s, Ai Weiwei already rejected 
both emulation of the West and nativism as 
inadequate standpoints, advocating instead 
civic engagement, creative independence, 
and the courage to affirm the value of human 
life. 
Centred around the values of ‘clarity’ 
and ‘awakening’, the approach described 
above represents what we have termed 
‘communication activism’ and permeates 
Ai Weiwei’s art as well as his social media 
communication (e.g. blogging, tweeting, etc.). 
Ai Weiwei designs both so that instances of 
oppression and injustice hit the audience 
with maximum brutality and effectiveness, 
delivering a clear message and eliciting 
compassion. His art documenting and 
mourning the death of schoolchildren in 
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake reflects this 
methodology (e.g. Remembering, 2009), as 
do his recent installations in Amsterdam 
(#SafePassage, 2016), Berlin (2016), Florence 
(Reframe, 2016), New York (Laundromat, 
2016) Vienna (F Lotus, 2016), Copenhagen 
(Soleil Levant, 2017), and Prague (Law of the 
Journey and Laundromat, 2017), all related 
to the refugee crisis.
Denouncing European 
Indifference
In 2015, the Chinese government returned 
Ai Weiwei’s confiscated passport. It is 
hard to speculate under what conditions 
his passport was returned, except that he 
promised to inform the Chinese authorities 
of any upcoming exhibition. Even though Ai 
Weiwei appeared to make relatively benign 
statements regarding the Chinese legal 
system to the German press, he continues to 
denounce censorship in China. It is worth 
remembering that Ai Weiwei has been long 
critical of US and European authorities, 
criticising civil rights abuses in the United 
States and showing support for Chelsea 
Manning, Edward Snowden, and even Julian 
Assange on social media. 
Shortly after Ai Weiwei relocated to 
Berlin looking for ‘a normal life’, he left 
on a journey around the Mediterranean Sea 
to document the conditions of refugees and 
migrants in the region. Ai Weiwei’s portrayal 
of their lives, their odyssey, and their clashes 
with the European authorities have reached 
a global audience through various artistic 
mediums, a constant stream of Instagram and 
Twitter posts, and now also a documentary 
film (Human Flow, 2017). Furthermore, 
news media and online art magazines have 
75MADE IN CHINA -  WORK OF ARTS
MADE IN CHINA - WORK OF ARTS
conveyed images of that art to an audience 
much larger than the number of people who 
could see it in person. It is worth noting that 
during the years when Ai Weiwei aimed his 
activism mainly at the Chinese Party-state 
(i.e. 2008–2014), news outlets such as The 
New York Times, The Guardian, and CNN 
played a key role in establishing his celebrity 
status. As Chloe Preece wrote in 2015, 
they framed Ai Weiwei as ‘a political hero/
martyr’ who fought for freedom of expression 
against a repressive regime—a narrative 
that provided ‘reassurance of the West’s 
ideological superiority’ and thus contributed 
to his popularity among their audience/
readership. Ai Weiwei’s art and activism with 
regard to the plight of Middle Eastern and 
African refugees—a plight exacerbated by 
the policies of European countries, which he 
accuses of culpable indifference—undermines 
that narrative and partially recasts his media 
persona from one extolling the virtues of 
Western political systems, to one lambasting 
the moral paucity of their current leaders.
On the other hand, the portrayal of 
refugees in Ai Weiwei’s photographs—and 
occasionally even in his artworks—tends to 
decontextualise its subject. Similar criticism 
was raised against his appropriation of the 
image of Alan Kurdi, a child who drowned 
in the Mediterranean Sea while trying to 
reach Greece, and his recent documentary 
film Human Flow (2017). Ai Weiwei’s 
Mediterranean journey mainly reached us 
via a stream of snippets and images usually 
provided with little background information 
or references. In particular, portraits of 
refugees on Ai Weiwei’s Instagram commonly 
lack details with regard to where they were 
taken, by whom, or the identity of those 
portrayed: Who are the men and women 
appearing next to Ai Weiwei in his selfies? 
The same questions could be asked of the 
photographic wallpapers in Laundromat 
and Law of the Journey. Moreover, on social 
media Ai Weiwei intertwines refugee-related 
fragments—photos, headlines, data, etc.—
with equally fragmentary peeks into his 
professional and private life, including selfies 
and images of exhibitions, famous friends, 
press photographers, his son, and so on. Images 
of life in refugee camps alternate seamlessly 
with snapshots from the glamorous life of a 
celebrity artist. Some of the latter could be 
read as portraits of the artist as a celebrity, 
à la Warhol, the difference being that Andy 
Warhol posed as politically neutral while Ai 
Weiwei as hyper-political. When one looks 
at Ai Weiwei’s photo-blogging as a whole, it 
appears to translate his preference for clarity 
and transparency into a one-man reality 
show. Drawing on Preece’s analysis, one may 
view this as the artist’s ‘celebritised selves’ 
constructing and managing authenticity as a 
pillar of the Ai Weiwei brand.   
Not unlike Ai Weiwei’s work on the Sichuan 
earthquake, his artistic endeavours on the 
refugee crisis develop a narrative that ‘unfolds 
across multiple media platforms, with each 
new text making a distinct and valuable 
contribution to the whole’ and where ‘each 
medium does what it does best.’ Ai Weiwei’s 
‘transmedia’ narrative on the refugee crisis 
unfolds beyond the artwork across platforms, 
such as: Instagram, where one can pore over a 
first-person documentation-cum-spectacle 
of the journey that brought about the works 
of art; Twitter, where one can peruse the 
artist’s own selection of news articles on the 
issue and thereby appreciate its importance; 
interviews in newspapers and magazines in 
which the artist expounds his vision; YouTube 
videos; a documentary film; etc. 
A Lost Battle?
One would expect the sophisticated web 
of content offered by such a ‘transmedia 
storytelling system’ to multiply the power 
of Ai Weiwei’s communication activism. 
But Ai Weiwei himself appears to have 
identified a crack in this mode of activism. 
The centrepiece in one of his most recent 
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installations, Law of the Journey, consists of 
a seventy-metre long overcrowded lifeboat. 
Currently displayed in Prague, the lifeboat 
is suspended in the hall of the Trade Fair 
Palace, which Nazi Germany utilised during 
the Second World War as an assembly point 
for Jewish prisoners before deporting them 
to the concentration camp of Terezín. The 
visitor enters the hall from the short side 
facing the front of the lifeboat. A series of 
quotes are arranged on the floor across the 
entire room in a way that forces the reader 
to walk backwards towards the opposite side, 
where the exit is located. One of the last 
quotes, right behind the stern of the lifeboat, 
is an extract from Letters to Olga (1988) by 
Vaclav Havel and it reads: ‘The tragedy of 
modern man is not that he knows less and less 
about the meaning of his own life, but that it 
bothers him less and less.’ 
When addressing the scandal of the 
children who died when poorly built schools 
collapsed in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, 
Ai Weiwei’s adversary was a Party-state that 
regarded even the number of said children as 
a sensitive piece of information. The simple 
yet brave act of researching their identities 
through a collective effort and then hanging 
the list of the children’s names on a wall as a 
piece of art—as Ai Weiwei did in the Sichuan 
Earthquake Names Project (2009)—sends 
a clear and shocking message that compels 
the viewer to demand more transparency and 
accountability from the Chinese government. 
With his work on the refugee crisis, Ai 
Weiwei brings a method designed and honed 
under that regime to a continent where most 
citizens have access to exhaustive data and 
reportage on the issue, but few demand their 
governments to respond to it by saving as 
many human lives as possible. As Ai Weiwei 
may have realised when he added that 
quote on the floor of the Trade Fair Palace, 
European indifference and prejudice may be 
at least as stubborn and difficult to defeat as 
the Chinese Party-state.
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Since the 1980s the Chinese Communist Party 
has condemned the Cultural Revolution as ‘ten 
years of chaos’. Nevertheless, so far there has 
been very little discussion on the topic in the 
public sphere in China. This essay looks into 
how private collections of red relics can be used 
to confront this void in China’s recent past. It 
argues that collected objects play a much more 
complex role in history production than we may 
think, as they contribute to the construction of 
narratives, put forth counter-narratives, and 
fragment the very idea of historical narrative 
altogether.
The summer of 2017 saw the ninetieth 
anniversary of the founding of China’s People’s 
Liberation Army. The occasion was marked 
not only by a massive rally that was streamed 
live on television—an unequivocal display 
of military power overseen by President Xi 
Jinping—but also by a number of exhibitions. 
This fact, in and of itself, is unsurprising, 
given the boom in museums and so-called ‘red 
tourism’ in China in recent years. One such 
exhibition was held at the Urban Planning 
Museum in Beijing’s Chaoyang Park, and was 
significant, less for its content and curation 
than for its organisers: it was a collaborative 
effort between the government of Chaoyang 
district in Beijing, the well-known flea 
market of Panjiayuan, and the Red Collectors 
Collecting the Red Era 
in Contemporary China
Figure 1: View of the exhibition in Chaoyang Park Beijing, August 2017. Author’s photo. 
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Committee of the China National Collectors 
Association.
The Red Collectors Association is a 
nationally approved body that brings together 
collectors of Maoist material culture. For 
this exhibition, they provided over 1,500 so-
called ‘red relics’ (hongse wenwu), drawn 
from the private collections of association 
members from around the country. Somewhat 
peculiarly, the exhibition almost entirely 
excluded discussion of the objects themselves, 
using them as simple accessories for the 
broader narrative that was expounded in great 
detail on the walls of the exhibition. While it 
could be argued that in doing so the curators 
missed an opportunity to add an extra layer 
of interest to their exhibition, such a strategy 
is perhaps not surprising given the sensitivity 
that surrounds the writing of modern Chinese 
history. Indeed, while the curators worked 
hard to portray the red relics as an intrinsic 
part of China’s ‘red legacy’, in reality these 
relics occupy a somewhat contradictory place 
in contemporary China.
‘Red relics’ are objects from the ‘Red Era’, 
a term that can indicate any period after 
the founding of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 1921, but most often refers to 
the decades between 1949 and 1976. Many 
collections are strongest in objects from the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a highly 
controversial period that saw the production 
of abundant and hugely diverse material 
culture. Since the 1980s, the Cultural 
Revolution has been condemned by the 
CCP as ‘ten years of chaos’, but it continues 
to be the subject of both celebratory and 
condemnatory memories in China. These 
contradictory remembrances are well 
known, even if there is little discussion on 
the topic in the public sphere. For example, 
the Cultural Revolution was not mentioned 
at the Chaoyang Exhibition, except for brief 
mention of the country’s foreign policy at that 
time. If we want, therefore, to understand 
how collections can be used to confront 
China’s recent past, we need to look beyond 
public exhibitions, and consider the practices 
of China’s red collectors.
(left) Figure 2: A photograph of Chinese President Xi Jinping in the entrance hall of the exhibition. The 
second quote reads: ‘Utilise red resources, develop the red tradition, and pass on the red gene well.’ The 
exhibition tried to position the red relics on display as part of the ‘red resources’ Xi mentions. (right) 
Figure 3: Posters depicting some of the Ten Marshals and, below, a selection of military medals. Photos 
taken by the author.
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Fragmented Narratives: 
Li Jun
Collected objects play a much more complex 
role in constructing historical narratives than 
we may think. We might be tempted to think 
of a collection as a systematic accumulation 
of historical traces. By acquiring and then 
protecting these remains, the collector 
ensures the survival of these remnants of 
history, and thus ensures historical continuity. 
However, theorists, such as Susan Stewart, 
problematise the relationship between 
history and a collection, and argue that the 
collected object, rather than preserving 
history, in fact destroys it. Indeed, the implicit 
search for an internal relationship between 
the present and the past that is embedded in 
the act of collecting is marked by an absolute 
disruption, whereby entering a collection, 
the object must be removed from the context 
from which it previously derived value and 
meaning. The relationship, then, is not rooted 
in historical reality, but rather represents 
an aesthetic denial of historical value. For 
this reason, Stewart calls a collection the 
‘total aestheticisation of use value’, and 
the place where history is transformed 
into space: a transformation that is marked 
most profoundly by the establishment of 
boundaries. According to Jean Baudrillard, 
a collection is defined by the establishment 
of a series—sets into which objects can be 
classified, defined by the collector, and with 
reference to the collector. In other words, 
in the classic manifestation of a collection, 
classification does not put forward an 
historical narrative, but rather fragments any 
such narrative through serialisation. 
Cultural Revolution objects, despite their 
origin in perhaps the most anti-capitalist period 
in modern Chinese history, lend themselves 
remarkably easily to the commodification 
that serialisation necessitates. For instance, 
Li Jun, a collector from Ningbo, Zhejiang 
province, began collecting Mao badges five 
years ago, primarily as a hobby and as a way 
to relieve the stress of his high-level job in a 
fashion company. According to an interview 
that I had with him in June 2016, since then 
he has acquired over thirty thousand Mao 
badges, as well as military and labour medals. 
He stores them in immaculately organised 
stacks of shelves in his spacious modern flat, 
organised primarily by aesthetic similarity. 
There are trays of young Mao on his way 
to Anyuan, Mao in wheat fields, Mao in 
every imaginable pose and in front of every 
imaginable background, all neatly arranged 
(see Figures 4 and 5). 
(Left) Figure 4: A selection of Li Jun’s Mao badges. (Right) Figure 5: 1950s military medals and the 
accompanying ‘meritorious medal certificate’, which contains details of their original owners. Images 
supplied by Li Jun, 2017
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Leading figures in the Collectors Association 
encourage members to do research on and 
through their objects. Li argues that the work 
units (danwei) and military units listed on 
the back of many badges can be a starting 
point for understanding cultural production 
during the Cultural Revolution. But, in fact, 
organising badges by appearance does not 
encourage their insertion into a historical 
narrative, but rather into an aesthetic series in 
which history is fragmented and objects gain 
their importance only from their appearance 
and their similarity (or dissimilarity) to their 
neighbours. 
Badges have been a popular collectible 
in China since the early 1990s, and to be 
considered a collector of any merit, one must 
have some ten thousand unique objects. But 
the real way to distinguish oneself in this 
highly competitive field is to complement 
bulk objects with more rare examples. In 
Li’s case, the pride of his collection is a small 
number of model worker medals and military 
medals, primarily from the 1950s. These are 
marked out by Li’s attempt to historicise 
them: he not only collects the medals, but 
also tries to acquire the personal documents 
of each medal’s former owner. In doing so, he 
is able to attach a personal narrative to the 
objects, but the process also highlights the 
historical distance between their original 
context and the present. 
Image-Driven Archiving: 
Dong Zhongchao
Other collectors deal with the problem of 
historicisation in different ways. Beijing 
collector Dong Zhongchao—whom I 
interviewed in 2016 and 2017—began trading 
and then collecting Mao-era posters in the 
1990s, but in the 2000s he started to expand 
the scope of his collection. It now includes all 
sorts of daily life objects, such as mugs, plates, 
basins, teapots and thermoses, textiles and 
clothing, mirrors, toys, and other items that 
similarly share the Maoist aesthetic of the 
time. Alongside this, he also collects things 
such as Mao busts and other sculptures, 
editions of the Little Red Book, and Mao 
badges, but Dong makes no discursive or 
practical distinction between these and those 
daily life objects, mixing them all together 
(Left) Figure 6: Beijing collector Dong Zhongchao in front of his shelf of enamel mugs, which are organised 
thematically. (Right) Figure 7: While Dong started off collecting posters, he now collects anything that 
reflects the red aesthetic of the Mao years. Image supplied by Dong Zhongchao, 2016.
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both on the shelves and in his conversations. 
Compared to Li’s ordered trays, Dong’s 
memorabilia are stacked and heaped in an 
overflowing storeroom, as well as scattered 
throughout his home. But his collection is also 
meticulously digitised, and it is in his digital 
collection that his conception of history 
becomes apparent. In addition to organising 
his objects thematically, by place, or by period 
as is common in many collections, Dong takes 
particular pleasure in matching up his items 
with correspondent visual depictions in 
propaganda posters (see images 9 and 10). 
It could be suggested that this type of 
archiving practice seeks to legitimise 
the imagery presented in the posters by 
demonstrating that the materiality of the life 
depicted in the posters can be recollected. 
Possessing the physical objects visible in 
posters seems to endorse the historicity of 
the poster image, suggesting the reality of the 
poster messages by virtue of the reality of the 
objects depicted in it. But the strategy also 
works the other way around, as an attempt to 
heal the fissure in the relationship between 
past and present by using the poster imagery 
to provide the missing context for the 
collected objects. This strategy has a number 
(Left) Figure 8: Dong’s storeroom, containing statues, mirrors, a television, a bicycle, and myriad other 
objects. (Right) Figure 9: Dong’s archival strategy: matching imagery from posters with objects from 
daily life. Photo provided by Dong Zhongchao, 2016.
of implications for the conceptualisation of 
the relationship between collected object and 
historical narrative. 
Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that 
modern historical consciousness is formed 
by taking objects that are contemporaneous 
with us and seeing them as ‘relics’ from the 
past. Doing this limits the historical object’s 
power because it denies the possibility of a 
lived relation with the present—any impact 
the object still has is just an effect of the 
past. Thus, the historical object is doubly 
denied agency: firstly, by its removal from the 
context in which it originally had meaning; 
and secondly, by its reconceptualisation as a 
‘relic’. Dong’s approach attempts to restore 
an agency to the object: combining the actual 
objects with their visual portrayal in posters 
is an attempt to construct a new, more active 
way of engaging with both posters and real 
objects, transporting the viewer back to the 
Mao era, and reaffirming the validity of the 
values of that time, a period that he sees as 
characterised by greater equality compared 
to the corruption and individualism of 
contemporary Chinese society. 
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Figure 10: Dong’s efforts to match poster 
imagery with objects goes beyond just 
objects of ‘daily life’. Photo provided by Dong 
Zhongchao, 2016.
Total Recall?
Susan Stewart argues that the problem 
with trying to use relics to overcome the gap 
between past and present is that objects recall 
not the experience lived, but the experience 
voluntarily remembered. However, in today’s 
China, where public discussion of memories 
of the Cultural Revolution remains limited, 
it is precisely memories, including those 
expressed through collecting practices, which 
are needed. While the Chaoyang Exhibition 
presented a clear narrative of the military’s 
smooth rise to power and prominence, other 
collecting practices hold the possibility 
of telling more complicated stories. That 
these stories lack coherence is not a bad 
thing. Indeed, what is needed are multiple, 
overlapping, even conflicting narratives. If 
we understand the archival practices of red 
collectors as exercises in historical memory 
and as forms of historical writing, we can 
appreciate them for their diversity. Objects 
and their collections construct narratives, 
put forth counter-narratives, and fragment 
the very idea of narratives altogether. When 
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considered collectively, they represent one 
of the ways in which contemporary China is 
attempting to deal with its difficult recent 
past. 
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Maria Repnikova’s new book Media 
Politics in China: Improvising Power Under 
Authoritarianism (Cambridge University 
Press, 2017) challenges conventional 
understandings of the role of critical 
journalists in authoritarian regimes, painting 
a picture of reporting in China as a balancing 
act of creativity, experimentation, and 
restriction. For our Academic Watch, we 
spoke with her. 
Recently, much attention has been given 
to Xi Jinping’s reaffirmation of the media as 
the Party’s mouthpiece (houshe). Your book 
complicates this identity. What can studying 
the media in China reveal about China’s 
political system? 
Maria Repnikova: My book demonstrates 
that other than the traditional mouthpiece 
role of the media, an alternative function of 
media supervision (yulun jiandu) has been 
promoted in the official discourse in the 
past three decades. The analysis of yulun 
Media Politics in China 
Improvising Power Under 
Authoritarianism
jiandu reasserts and complicates the model 
of consultative authoritarianism—a defining 
framework for analysing China’s political 
system in the past decade, which suggests that 
the Party’s consultations with societal forces 
work to improve governance and legitimise 
the regime.  My book shows that in endorsing 
and tolerating some media supervision in the 
form of investigative and critical reporting, 
the authorities intended to better gauge and 
respond to public sentiments. At the same 
time, the party-state has treated this channel 
with significant ambiguity. Namely, the 
authorities have resisted institutionalising 
media supervision, have deployed ad hoc 
inventive restrictions against journalists, and 
have only addressed media investigations at 
a superficial level, burying systemic issues 
in the discourse of state responsiveness. In 
the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake, 
for instance, the authorities reacted to media 
investigations of the school scandal by quickly 
rebuilding the damaged schools and publicly 
promoting reconstruction efforts. However, 
they did not address the accountability 
failures of local officials highlighted in 
media reports, and forbade the media from 
further investigating this issue. To this day, 
the Wenchuan disaster remains a sensitive 
topic for media practitioners. This doesn’t 
render media investigations meaningless, 
as journalists still dare to report on public 
discontent without legal protection from the 
state, and at times these reports even trigger 
an official and public reaction to important 
societal issues. Nonetheless, my book calls for 
more critical rethinking of the framework of 
consultative authoritarianism to account for 
the state-directed nature of these feedback 
channels or consultations, which significantly 
limit the scope of societal input into policy-
making. 
Your book offers a powerful critique of the 
discourse that sets the relationship between 
authoritarian governments and media in 
terms of control/domination and resistance/
democratisation. What do you find troubling 
about this framework? 
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MR: This framework is problematic because 
it fails to account for the myriad interactions 
between the media and the state that reside in 
the dichotomy between complete suppression 
and romanticised revolutionary activism. 
In particular, it diminishes the creative 
agency of media professionals who are trying 
to manoeuvre within the web of complex 
regulations and informal pressures, as well as 
incentives, from authorities. It further ignores 
the presence of grey zones where sensitive, 
but semi-permissible, issues continue to be 
probed by journalists and media activists 
in China and other authoritarian contexts. 
Most authoritarian regimes allow for limited 
media pluralism—how this works (especially 
in comparative contexts) can inform us as 
much about the political limits set out by the 
state, as about the nature of contestation on 
the boundary, or the ways in which actors 
operating on the margins can push the limits 
whilst still remaining part of the system. In 
stepping beyond the framework of control 
and dramatic resistance, we are able to better 
investigate the lived realities of Chinese 
citizens, their ambitions, struggles, and 
imaginaries—these realities in turn paint a 
more complex political picture than one of 
pure resilience or collapse. 
In your book, you argue that the ambiguous 
rules and grey areas of the permissible in China 
leave space for creativity, improvisation, and 
boundary testing by journalists and editors. Is 
that still the case in Xi Jinping’s China? 
MR: The grey zone has definitely shrunk 
under President Xi, with state control 
intensifying at all levels of media management. 
At the same time, creative improvisation by 
journalists and editors persists. Whereas 
the influence of the once famous Southern 
Weekend has declined, for instance, a new 
Shanghai-based outlet, Pengpai, also known 
as The Paper, has published some successful 
investigative and in-depth reporting in recent 
years, including the well-known investigation 
of Zhou Yongkang, as well as quality 
reporting on the 2015 Tianjin explosion 
and the contaminated vaccine scandal. 
Party media also still continue to carry out 
internal investigative reporting (neican) 
domestically and, now, internationally. 
Creative journalistic efforts are also evident 
at the Beijing-based Xinjing Bao and Caixin 
magazine, as well as at online platforms like 
Tongxun and Sohu. Moreover, as traditional 
reporting has come under pressure, new 
inventive forms of expression have emerged, 
such as creative non-fiction, online talk 
shows, futuristic novels, and more. The 
resilience of the ingenious spirit never ceases 
to amaze me. 
Given all the challenges they face in their 
profession, why would someone in today’s 
China want to be a journalist? 
 
MR: Some of the motivations for becoming 
a journalist mirror those in other countries. 
Most young journalists I spoke to are curious, 
eager to see more of the world, prefer 
movement and adrenalin to staying still—
they are risk-takers. In China, however, there 
are also political and somewhat idealistic 
motivations driving the more critically-
oriented media professionals, including 
a desire to help ordinary people through 
their reporting, to hold some officials 
(typically at the local level) accountable, 
and to help gradually improve China’s 
governance—especially when it comes to the 
management of hot social issues such as food 
safety, environmental degradation, societal 
inequality, and natural/man-made disasters. 
Many journalists I spoke to resemble a mix 
of activists and entrepreneurs rather than 
strictly media professionals—they are at once 
reporters and opportunistic civil society 
actors finding loopholes in the system to get 
their voices heard. Most recently, journalists 
are also motivated by having shares in the 
media business, which has led to an exodus 
of many journalists from state-owned outlets 
into new media ventures. 
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